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After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and currently with the prepa-
rations for European economic governance, the EU has received new and 
extended competences. At the same time, its popularity with the citizens of 
its Member States has never been as low as it is today. 
 
One of the reasons for the gap between the EU’s competences and its popu-
larity among ordinary citizens is that the entire structure of the EU is ex-
tremely complex. Even for journalists it is often hard to grasp what are the 
effects of the various stages of decision-making and who are the main actors. 
If this already holds for the formal rules governing decision-making, the 
reality is even more complex due to the influence of interest representatives 
at every level of the decision-making process. 
 
As Member of the European Parliament for the Dutch Socialist Party (SP), 
and as deputy member of the Budget Control Committee of the EP, I have 
tried to focus on a specific phenomenon which, I feared, only adds to the 
complicated nature of the decision-making process, i.e. the role of the dozens 
of EU-agencies. Against this background, I decided to ask several academic 
institutions to submit a proposal for a quick scan of the agencies and a more 
thorough analysis of a couple of specific agencies. 
 
Eventually, I was happy to agree with the proposal submitted by ITS of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen. This lead to the study ‘Keeping up appear-
ances’, a well chosen title for a study showing a clear lack of accountability 
of European agencies, both in terms of performance and of visibility to the 
public at large. 
 
I want to thank the researchers Gerrit Vrieze, Frederik Smit and Max Laven 
for their substantial work. Clearly, the study cannot be the final word about 
agencies. However, it does make it clear that the current lack of transparency 
 vi 
surrounding both the establishment of and the control over Agencies does not 
contribute to bridging the gap between the EU and the citizens in Europe. 
 
The researchers conclude, inter alia, that the European Parliament should 
become more active in evaluating not only the legitimacy of the agencies’ 
expenditures, but also their efficiency, effectiveness and social accountabil-
ity. In other words: do we get value for money, do the Agencies meet the 
objectives set in their work programmes and are their activities relevant for 
the citizens in Europe? Based on this study, and on submissions from the 
Agencies themselves and the European Court of Auditors, I shall raise these 
matters in the Budget Control Committee, and discuss them also with the 
chair of the inter-institutional working group on agencies, which is about to 
continue its activities with even more vigour immediately after summer. 
Hopefully, it will be possible to use the findings also in the context of the 
multi-annual budgetary framework for the EU, which the Commission is 
currently preparing: although it will not be easy politically, I do hope that in 
the medium term it will be possible to reduce the number of Agencies and to 
make those that have proven to be both efficient and effective, more visible 
with increased citizens’ participation. 
 
Brussels, June 2011. 
 









The study is conducted by the Section Organisation and Policy of the Insti-
tute of Applied Social Sciences of the Radboud University Nijmegen (Neth-
erlands). The research team consisted of Gerrit Vrieze and Frederik Smit.  
Max Laven, student Political Sciences at the Nijmegen School of Manage-
ment of the Radboud University, contributed to the literature review. 
The research team is internally supervised by Jeroen Winkels and Peter 
Lucassen. Saline Toonen, student Communication Sciencies of the Radboud 
University, helped with the translation. 
 
We would like to thank Dennis de Jong and Machteld Velema of the Dutch 
Socialist Party for their constructive comment and help on this research.  
 
This research wouldn’t be possible without the cooperation of the inter-
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EU Agencies have been established to support the EU Member States and 
their citizens. These agencies are an answer to a desire of Member States for 
geographical devolution and the need to cope with new tasks of a legal, 
technical and/or scientific nature. They are meant to operate autonomous 
from the political centre. About 40 European Agencies are located in several 
Member States of the European Union (see Overview 3, pp. 15/16). In 1958 
Euratom, the first Agency, was established, followed in the beginning of the 
seventies by CEDEFOP (information on vocational education and training 
systems) and EUROFOUND (to provide information, advice and expertise on 
living and working conditions). The number of EU Agencies has increased 
exponentially since 1994. There are Agencies in the field of aviation safety, 
information security, disease prevention and control, railway agency and 
many more.  
Staff and budgets have grown. This is linked to an increase in Agencies’ 
tasks: regulation, decision-making, enforcing regulation.  
 
Agencies are attractive for Member States because of their autonomous status 
and employment possibilities. It is considered honourable to have an Agency 
within your borders. Agencies enjoy a considerable operational independ-
ence. The EU and its Member States have created European Agencies for a 
number of reasons (Vos, 2000):  
• The need for specialised expertise. 
• Remove some of the workload of the Commission. 
• Contribute to a better understanding of the EU. 
• Contribute to an enhanced transparency of the system. 
 
Agencies are categorised as Community Agencies and Union Agencies. The 
29 Community Agencies (also Decentralised Agencies) are part of the first 
pillar in which policy making has many supranational characteristics, 
whereas the three Union Agencies fall under the second pillar in which policy 
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making is essentially intergovernmental in nature. The six Executive Agen-
cies manage Community programmes. Euratom, consisting of four Agencies, 
has a special status but is as well intergovernmental. 
 
 
Overview of EU Agencies 
Category Number Prim. Competence 
Community or Decentralised Agencies 29 Commission 
Executive Agencies 6 Commission 
Union Agencies 3 Council 
Euratom 4 Council 
 
 
Delegating certain tasks and powers from the European treaty-based institu-
tions to autonomous decentralised EU Agencies evokes a number of issues 
(Andoura & Timmerman, 2008; Bovens, 2010; Busuioc, 2010; Groenleer, 
2009):  
• Accountability: to whom are Agencies answerable? Who runs these or-
ganisations, who controls them? (political, administrative, financial and 
social accountability) 
• Legitimacy: too much independence leads to the critique of a technocratic 
culture and insufficient participation of external stakeholders. 
• Heterogeneity: most Agencies are established in an ad hoc approach, 
resulting in a lack of coherence.  
• Decentralisation: the idea of Community interest is not reflected in the 
way Member States approach the issue of allocating an Agency seat.  
 
Recently, there have been several initiatives to improve the functioning of 
Agencies: 
• Andoura & Timmerman ignited the reform debate on European Agencies 
by raising the key issues (2008). 
• Ramboll, Euréval and Matrix evaluated the (26) Decentralised Agencies in 
2009. 
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• The European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of 
the European Union have started an inter-institutional working group on 
European Agencies. In 2011 a proposal is expected.  
 
Before deciding about the budgets for European Agencies over 2013-2020 it 
is important to start a discussion about the way to improve the functioning of 
these Agencies. 
 
Dennis de Jong, member of the European Parliament for the Dutch Socialist 
Party (SP), invited the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (ITS) of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen to conduct a research on EU Agencies. ITS 
uses the concept of social accounting. The objective of the research is to: 
• Esteem the current level of accountability and efficiency. 
• Make policy recommendations. 
 
The study comprises a: 
• Literature review. 
• Two case studies. 







The research started with collecting basic information on the number of 
Agencies, revenues and budgets and number of staff. Where transparancy is 
needed, the EU offers unclarity. There are many lists of Agencies but most of 
them are incomplete. Most of the time the Union Agencies and Euratom are 
omitted, because they are seen within the Council’s competence. The Euro-
pean Commission and the European Council (Member States) are reluctant to 
interfere in each other’s claims. Furthermore, in most budgetary overviews 
Euratom is not included and neither are the Union Agencies. These Agencies 
are mainly financed by Member States. On the budget of Bodies set up by the 
European Union and having legal personality attention is paid to Decentral-
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ised and Executive Agencies and a new category Joint Undertakings to which 
ITER, a Euratom Agency, is belonging (European Commission, 2010a).  
 
A clear overview of the budgets of the Decentralised and Executive Agencies 
(coming primarily under the competency of the European Commission) are 
also tough to give. From the total revenues of the Decentralised Agencies in 
2011 (1438 million) 706 million is an EU contribution. Decentralised Agen-
cies are often co-financed by Member States and by external sponsors. There 
is no overview how much Member States and sponsors each contribute.  
The EU budget on Executive Agencies is 152 million in 2011. However, this 
is only the EU contribution to the Agency’s operating budget ( 3.4 percent of 
the total operating budget of the programmes). Must we conclude, nobody 
confirmed this, that the Executive Agencies manage about 4 billion euro in 
EU programmes (subsidies, research-programmes)? 
 
Comparable figures about the administrative and operational budgets of 
Agencies are hard to obtain. According to Groenleer (2009) the budget is 
divided into three titles. Title 1 contains personnel-related expenses, title 2 
administrative and title 3 contains operative expenses. We find that most 
Agencies only distinguish between administrative and operational budgets. In 
practice, it is impossible to compare Agencies on financial indicators. 
 
Our findings show: 
• In most of the lists of Agencies some (types of) Agencies are missing, 
they are never complete. 
• Financial control is taking place regularly; still a clear, transparent over-
view lacks.  
• Budget definitions are difficult to compare, especially administrative and 
operating costs. 
• The available information of the EU is fragmented, detailed and often 
incomparable. It is left to the user to make sense of it.  
Another problem we faced in our research is that it is hard to obtain quantita-
tive information about the functioning of the Agencies. This is in regards to 













number of experts and expert-groups. Most interviewees don’t have access to 
that kind of information.  
Many approached experts were reluctant to participate. We wondered why. 
Was it because of political reasons? Was it because they are part of what 
Geuijen (2008; see Bovens, 2010, 18) calls the ‘New Eurocrats’ who averted 
inspection? ‘These are not the Commission officials who belong to the much-
maligned ‘Brussels bureaucracy’. They are the much more sizeable armies of 
national public servants and related ‘experts’ who piggyback on EU commit-
tee meetings to form and maintain networks of like-minded people working 
on the same issues in different countries’ (cit, Bovens, 2010, pp. 18).  
Therefore, we are especially thankful for the cooperation of the interviewees 




The research has a limited character, but it shows that only on paper there is 
an acceptable level of accountability. In practice the system is not transpar-
ent. European Agencies are meant to operate autonomously, but it is unclear 
to whom they should report to in regards to their actions and decisions. In the 
end the European Commission is responsible for the work and decisions 
taken by the Decentralised and the Executive Agencies. Therefore, the Euro-
pean Parliament should hold the European Commission accountable for the 
functioning of the Decentral and Executive Agencies. For the Union Agen-
cies this is unclear. National Parliaments have a role.  
 
 











The research indicates several shortcomings on the system of accountability 
and control:  
• Budgetary control of the European Commission should be guaranteed by 
internal audits, annual reports by the Court of Auditors and the investiga-
tions conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). However, 
The Court of Auditors investigates only whether the money is spend le-
gally and regularly. The internal audits are not sufficiently owned and 
used. Performance reporting is almost nonexistent (Ramboll, 2009).  
• On paper the Commission controls the Executive Agencies but the Court 
of Auditors says the Commission’s supervision of the Executive Agencies’ 
work is quite limited (European Court of Auditors, 2009).  
• In particular, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union would have the right to ask the director of Agencies to inform them 
about the Agency’s activities. But Parliament and Council seldom use 
their powers. Formally, the European Commission is responsible and they 
should be held accountable for the work and decisions of European Agen-
cies. The powerful force of the discharge procedure makes Agency direc-
tors accountable for regularity, but not for performance (Ramboll, 2009). 
• The control of the European Commission is one-sided financially oriented. 
We thought that Agencies, because they are meant to operate autono-
mously in relation to the political centre, would be eager to show the 
European citizen their outcome. No, agencies are disguising themselves 
behind financial control. It gives no indication whether the budget is spend 
efficient or effective (Ramboll, 2009).  
• The establishment of Agencies is often characterized by ‘horse trading’ 
(Ramboll, 2009). Their managerial, political, financial and judicial ac-
countability show serious flaws (Busuioc, 2010).  
 
In a broad view there seems to be a lot of accountability regarding EU Agen-
cies. The control is financially oriented and the other instruments have short-
comings. If one takes a closer look, it never is what it seems to be. Account-
ability is often: Keeping up Appearances. The official message is that 





It’s not possible to estimate the level of efficiency of EU Agencies. The 
control of EU Agencies only investigates whether the money is spend legal 
and regular. There are no studies which question: Could we have the same 
result with less money? The available information does not allow to judge on 
efficiency of EU Agencies. Some Agencies work on performance indicators 
exploring what they do. This is only a part of what should be done.  
Not only efficiency measures are necessary, but also effectiveness measures. 
What is needed are outcome indicators. The barriers towards effective EU 
Agencies consists of the fact that they stick to definitional, legal, financial 
and procedural problems. Normally starting Agencies deal with these issues. 
But after 10-20 years they should act more mature and put social issues and 
effectiveness first. The Agencies are ‘wrestling’ with how to measure their 
effectiveness. An open, innovative culture in Agencies is needed to recover 
trust (Smits, Kuhlmann & Shapira, 2010). 
 




• Stop the division between Communion and Union Agencies which leads to 
intransparency 
For the European citizens it not important whether Agencies have commu-
nitarian or intergovernmental mandates. European Commission and Euro-
pean Council should act as one in regards to the governing of EU Agen-
cies.  
 
• Consider a clear legal foundation for Agencies, preferably Treaty-based 
This is very complicated but our interviewees told us that an opportunity is 
missed with the Lisbon Treaty. Agencies lack a coherent legal basis.  
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• Make the establishment of Agencies transparent 
The current establishment of European Agencies is often a result of politi-
cal ‘horsetrading’ or ‘package deals’. It should be made more objective 




• Hold the European Commission accountable for the functioning of the 
Communitarian (Decentralised and Executive) Agencies 
The European Parliament representing the citizens should hold the Euro-
pean Commission accountable for the functioning of the Decentralised and 
Executive Agencies. In the end the Commission is responsible for all deci-
sions taken by Agencies. (Unless there is a clear legal basis or when the 
Council is placed above the Commission). 
 
• Represent the European citizen in the Agencies 
The ‘citizen’s interest’ is hardly ever represented in the Boards of the 
Agencies. The interest of the citizen should be leading. 
 
• Agencies must be social accountable 
Most control of the European Commission now is one-sided financially 
oriented. Financial accounting gives little information on the performing 
and effectiveness of Agencies. Needed is a change from a bureaucratic to a 
more innovative, open culture. The introduction of social accountability 
focuses on participation, empowerment, generating and evaluating alterna-
tives, evaluation on effectiveness and learning. 
 
• European citizens should be more involved in the operation of European 
institutions in general 
The culture in European institutions can be described as bureaucratic, le-
galistic and oriented towards policy-making in the Member States. Europe 
should be brought back into the hearts and minds of its citizens by being 






• Budgets should be awarded more responsive and less automatically 
extended 
There is a lot of financial control towards Agencies. Still a clear, transpar-
ent overview lacks. Inspected is whether the budget is spend regular. We 
hardly found any studies on efficiency: could we have the same result with 
less money? Too often budgets are automatically extended. The culture is 
focussed on control, not on learning. 
 
• Conduct research on effectiveness of Agencies 
Not only efficiency is needed, also effectiveness must be studied. The dis-
cussion on European Agencies is far too legalistic. We need more informa-
tion about the outcome of Agencies. The European Commission should 
develop a sufficient framework of indicators for the functioning of Agen-
cies.  
 
• European Parliament make more use of your present rights 
The European Parliament has gained more power (information and dis-
charging power). Address the Commission on the functioning of Decen-
tralised and Executive Agencies. Higher standards are needed for the func-

















There is an abundance of literature on European Agencies. Much research on 
European Agencies has been done from a legalistic or thematic point of view. 
Andoura & Timmerman (2008) ignited the reform debate about the European 
Agencies with a review addressing the issues regarding Agencies. In 2009 a 
study on the Decentralised European Agencies was conducted by Ramboll 
(2009). The literature review also found that an inter-Institutional Working 
Group advised on regulatory Agencies (Papastamkos, 2008). Recently, two 
dissertations were conducted on the autonomy and accountability of Euro-
pean Agencies. With their case studies the studies give a deep insight in the 
functioning of Agencies (Groenleer, 2009; Busuioc, 2010). Their case studies 
look beyond the façade of Agencies.  
Our literature review is mainly based on Andoura &Timmerman, Ramboll, 
Groenleer and Busuioc. It’s beyond the scope of this limited literature review 
to address all questions in depth. We focussed our review on: 
• An overview of the European Agencies (1.2) 
and on three topics based on the research questions: 
• What is the best definition of the Agencies? (1.3). 
• What is the legal basis of the Agencies? (1.4). 
• What is the accountability of the Agencies? (1.5). 





The literature review started with collecting basic information on the number 
of Agencies, revenues and budgets and the number of staff.  
 
 12 
Most overviews contain a list of Agencies, location, year of establishment 
and founding regulations. This information (Eurospeak) is repeated again and 
again. But if one tries to find exact numbers, budgets and number of persons 
working in Agencies Europe gives no clear basis. Where clarity is needed, 
the EU offers no transparency.  
 
We indicate at least three shortcomings: 
 
A. The Union Agencies are often omitted  
Most of the time the Union Agencies and Euratom are omitted, because they 
are seen within the Council’s competence. The European Commission and 
the Council (Member States) are reluctant to interfere in each other’s claims. 
In most budgetary overviews Euratom is not included as well as the Union 
Agencies is. These Agencies are mainly financed by Member States. On the 
budget of Bodies set up by the European Union and having legal personality 
attention is paid to Decentralised and Executive Agencies and a new category 
Joint Undertakings appears, to which ITER, a Euratom Agency is belonging 
(European Commission, 2010a).  
The EU uses all kind of divisions (pillars, union and community agencies, 
types) which lead to unclarity. 
 
B. No clear overview of revenues  
A clear overview of the budgets of the Decentralised and Executive Agencies 
(falling primarily under the competency of the European Commission) are 
also tough to obtain. From the total revenues of the Decentralised Agencies 
(1438 million) 706 million is an EU contribution. Decentralised Agencies are 
often co-financed by Member States and by external sponsors. There is no 
overview of how much Member States and sponsor each contribute.  
The EU budget on Executive Agencies is 152 million in 2011. However, this 
is only the EU contribution to the Agency’s operating budget ( 3.4 percent of 
the total operating budget of the programmes). Must we conclude, nobody 
confirmed this, that the Executive Agencies manage about 4 billion euro in 




C. Comparable figures about the administrative and operational budgets of 
Agencies are difficult to obtain  
According to Groenleer (2009) the budget is divided into three titles. Title 1 
contains personnel-related expenses, title 2 administrative and title 3 contain 
operative expenses. However, we find that most Agencies only distinguish 
between administrative and operational budgets. In practice, it is impossible 
to compare Agencies on these financial indicators.  
 
In most studies, researchers refrain from giving an overview of quantitative 
figures. Busuioc (2010) speaks of chasing a moving target. However, Ram-
boll (2009) does a tremendous job on the Decentralised Agencies (see annex 
3). 
 
Our findings show: 
• In most overviews some (types of) Agencies are missing, they are never 
complete. 
• Budgets are difficult to compare, especially administrative and operating 
costs.  
• There is a lot of information, but not transparent. It is left to the reader to 
make sense of it.  
 
Nevertheless, on the basis of different sources we made an overview (see 
Overview 1). Agencies are categorised as Community Agencies and Union 
Agencies. The 29 Community Agencies (also Decentralised Agencies) are 
part of the first pillar in which policy making has many supranational charac-
teristics, whereas the three Union Agencies fall under the second pillar in 
which policy making is essentially intergovernmental in nature. The six 
Executive Agencies manage Community programmes. Euratom, consisting 






Overview 1 – Types of EU Agencies 
Category Nr. Prim. Competence 
Community or Decentralised Agencies 29 Commission 
Executive Agencies 6 Commission 
Union Agencies 3 Council 
Euratom 4 Council 
 
 
Budgets and staff 
 
As mentioned, the budgets and staff numbers are difficult to obtain. This is 
the best we could do (Overview 2). (As the German television always said 
after giving the winning lottery-numbers: Wie immer ohne Gewähr (as al-
ways without guarantee)).  
The number of staff are full time equivalents and consists of authorised 
established posts, contract agents and seconded national experts.  
 
 
Overview 2 – Budgets and staff 
Category Budget total STAFF 
Community or Decentralised 
Agencies 
1438 million EURO (2011) 
706 million EU contribution 
5249 (filled 4704)  
Executive Agencies 152 million EURO (+ about 4 billion 
operating programmes and research?) 
1549 
Union Agencies 52 million EURO (2008) 245 approx. (2008) 
Euratom 275 million EURO (2009) ? 
 
 
The total budget is 1.8 billion EURO and about 7.000 people work in EU 






Overview 3 – List of European Agencies  
Community Agencies (First Pillar)  
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (at planning stage) 
(ACER)  
Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA)  
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)  
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA)  
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders (FRONTEX)  
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)  
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)  
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cede-
fop)  
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA)  
European Environment Agency (EEA)  
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)  
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (EUROFOUND)  
European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)  
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)  
European Medicines Agency (EMEA)  
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA)  
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)  
European Railway Agency – promoting safe and compatible rail 
systems (ERA) 
European Training Foundation (ETF)  
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)  
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and 
Designs) (OHIM)  
The European GNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA)  
Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT)  
European Police College (CEPOL)  
European Police Office (EUROPOL)  
































The Hague (Nl.) 
The Hague (Nl.) 
Union Agencies (Common Security and Defence Policy) (Second Pillar) 
European Defence Agency (EDA)  
European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS)  
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Executive Agencies  
Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)  
European Research Council Executive Agency (ERC Executive 
Agency)  
Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (EACI)  
Executive Agency for Health and Consumers (EAHC)  
Research Executive Agency (REA)  








EURATOM Agencies and bodies  
EURATOM Supply Agency (ESA)  
European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion 
Energy (Fusion for Energy) 
Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) Joint Undertaking 











The number of EU Agencies has increased especially since 1994. Some feel 
there is ‘mushrooming’ of these Agencies. Nevertheless recently several new 
European Agencies started. The appetite for creating new Agencies seems 
limitless (Gérardin & Petit, 2004). This mushrooming is linked to an increase 
in Agencies’ tasks: regulation, decision-making, enforcing regulation. The 
number of staff has grown.  
 
 







In the beginning EU Agencies were welcomed for their functional benefits 
and separation from political organs like the Council of the European Union 
and the European Commission. Recently they came under attack precisely 
due to their operation at a distance out of reach of the long-established con-
trols (Curtin, 2005). The need for Agency control and accountability was 
called for by academics as well as Commission and European Parliament.  
 
Agencies are blamed for several reasons (Ramboll, 2009; Andoura & 
Timmerman, 2008; European Commission, 2008): 
• Their establishment is not transparent. 
• Their financing is not transparent. 
• Their advices are unfocused. 
• Their work is not original. 
• Their (Board)composition is questionable. 
• They are uncontrollable. 
• They show no progression. 
• They have contradictive incoherent tasks. 




Andoura & Timmerman (2008) distinguish three generations, three waves, of 
European Agencies. 
 
First wave: information, research and soft coordination 
The first ‘wave’ of Agencies dates back to the mid-seventies of the last 
century, when on the domain of social policy two Agencies were created: (1) 
CEDEFOP (the European centre for the Development of Vocational Train-
ing, originally located in Berlin) and (2) EUROFOUND (the European Foun-
dation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, located in 
Dublin). The tasks of these Agencies existed of gathering information, re-




Second wave: market regulation 
The second ‘wave’ of Agencies dates back to the 90’s, when the completion 
of the internal market made administrative regulation necessary in the vari-
ous new policy areas. The overall idea was that such regulation at the Euro-
pean level could help overcome obstacles to the single European market. As 
the complexity and the extent of the European competences increased, it 
became apparent that the exclusively legislative approach to integration was 
imperfect: to achieve full market integration through harmonizing the na-
tional legislations required the transposition of European legislation in to 
national legislation. Given this growing need for administrative regulation at 
the European level, this led to the creation of new specialised Agencies in the 
early nineties.  
This wave stressed regulatory tasks, but in fact not all Agencies in this waved 
had a regulatory task. In 2005 the Commission specified regulatory in the 
draft of the Inter-institutional Agreement, but this makes it more unclear (see 
Andoura & Timmerman, 2.4.2., pp. 9). 
 Being ‘regulatory’ does not mean that every Agency of this kind can auto-
matically adopt binding legal rules or decisions. Regulatory activities do not 
necessary involve the adoption of legal acts. They may also involve measures 
of a more incentive nature, such as co-regulation, self-regulation, recom-
mendations, referral to the scientific authority, networking and pooling good 
practice, evaluating the application and implementation of rules, etc. It 
therefore follows that a European ‘regulatory’ Agency does not necessarily 
have the power to enact binding legal norms.  
This definition of the Commission makes regulatory diffuse. 
 
Market regulation, but also a social dimension 
The ‘internal market argument’ is particularly the case for the OHIM (Office 
for the harmonization of the Internal Market), the CPVO (Community Plant 
Variety Office) and the EMEA (European Medicines Agency), which are 
very active in the context of the free movement of goods in the European 
Union. However, several of these Agencies have also a specific social dimen-
sion attached to them. Exemplary for this category are the EU-OSHA (Euro-
pean Agency for Safety and Health at Work), the EMEA (European Medi-
cines Agency) and the EMCDDA (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction). All address health or safety aspects. As Chiti (2000), 
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Andoura & Timmerman (2008) state: these Agencies should be classified as 
‘market corrective’, rather than categorising these Agencies as social or 
market economy driven. 
This second generation accounted for 11 more Agencies. 
 
Third wave: refocus on core tasks Commission and delegation 
The third ‘wave’ of Agencies dates back to more recent times: this generation 
of Agencies has been set up since 2001 and can partly be explained by the 
desire of the Commission to refocus on its principal tasks at the time. After 
the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, due to fraud and misman-
agement, the new Prodi Commission launched an institutional audit to restore 
the faith in the Commission (Craig, 2003, in Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, 
pp. 2-3). One of the main findings regarding the need for the European 
Commission was to concentrate more on its core functions. Delegation of 
functions to bodies such as Agencies would enable the European Commis-
sion to concentrate more on its core tasks.  




In most overviews some (types of) Agencies are missing, they are never 
complete. Budgets are hard to compare. There is a lot of information, but not 
transparent. It’s like chasing a moving target (Busuioc, 2010). 
Nevertheless, on the basis of different sources we made an overview. Agen-
cies are categorised as Community Agencies and Union Agencies. The 29 
Community Agencies (also Decentralised Agencies) are part of the first pillar 
in which policy making has many supranational characteristics, whereas the 
three Union Agencies fall under the second pillar in which policy making is 
essentially intergovernmental in nature. The six Executive Agencies manage 
Community programmes. Euratom, consisting of four Agencies, has a special 
status. 
The total budget is 1.8 billion EURO and about 7.000 people work in EU 





1.3 Definition of EU Agencies 
 
The first question of the literature review was looking for a definition of EU 
Agencies. What we found were primarily general descriptions, but no defini-
tion.  
 
The official website of the EU Agencies says that EU Agencies have been 
established to support the EU Member States and their citizens. These agen-
cies are an answer to a desire for geographical devolution and the need to 
cope with new tasks of a legal, technical and/or scientific nature.  
EU Agencies are meant to operate autonomously from the political centre. 
Agencies are attractive for Member States because of their autonomous status 
and employment possibilities. It is considered honourable to have an Agency 
within your borders. Agencies enjoy a considerable operational independ-
ence. The EU and its Member States have created European Agencies for a 
number of reasons (Vos, 2000):  
• The need for specialised expertise. 
• Remove some of the workload of the Commission. 
• Contribute to a better understanding of the EU. 
• Contribute to an enhanced transparency of the system. 
 
Their activities vary: 
• Coordinating the decision-making process in Europe. 
• Executing European rules and measures. 
• Collecting and spreading information. 
 
There is no formal definition of what a European Agency exactly is, nor is 
there any single legal framework on which all Agencies are modelled. In 
general, the term ‘Agency’ can be used to describe a variety of organisations 
that perform tasks of a governmental nature and that often exist outside the 
institutional framework (Everson & Majone, 2001).  
 
There have been many attempts to categorize EU Agencies, but to no avail. 
One of the main problems is the division between Communion Agencies with 
supranational characteristics and the Union Agencies in which policy making 
is essentially intergovernmental in nature. This distinction promotes the 
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unclarity of European Agencies. For the citizens it is not important whether 
they have communitarian or intergovernmental mandates. These distinctions 
only express the internal powers divisions in Europe.  
 
The several European Agencies are grouped in different sets of categories. 
First, the European Commission grouped the Agencies in five different 
categories:  
 
1. Community Agencies  
A Community Agency is an Agency governed by European public law; it is 
distinct from the Community Institutions (Council, Parliament, and Commis-
sion) and has its own legal personality. It is set up by an act of secondary 
legislation in order to accomplish a very specific technical, scientific or 
managerial task. 
 
2.Common Security and Defence Policy Agencies  
These Agencies have been set up to carry out very specific technical, scien-
tific and management tasks within the framework of European Union’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy. 
 
3.Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters Agencies 
Another group of Agencies has been set up to help the EU Member States co-
operate in the fight against organised international crime. 
 
4. Executive Agencies  
Executive Agencies are organisations established in accordance with Council 
Regulation (EC) No 58/2003. They are being entrusted with certain tasks 
relating to the management of one or more Community programmes. These 
Agencies are set up for a fixed period. Their location has to be at the seat of 
the European Commission (Brussels or Luxembourg). 
 
5. EURATOM Agencies and bodies 
These Agencies are created to support the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity Treaty (EURATOM). The purpose of the Treaty is to coordinate the 
Member States’ research programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
to provide knowledge, infrastructure and funding of nuclear energy and to 
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ensure sufficiency and security of atomic energy supply (European Commis-
sion, 2010). 
 
This way of classifying the European Agencies is well accepted and well 
detailed. However, according to Sacchetti (2009), although such a functional 
typology can be helpful from an analytical point of view, it cannot be adapted 
as a basis for legal consequences or proposed reforms: first, it contains too 
many categories and second, it’s certainly not watertight, as some of the 
Agencies can easily fall within two or more of the categories.  
 
The other typology the European Commission made, is the distinction be-
tween Executive and Regulatory agencies, a much simpler functional typol-
ogy, which divides Agencies in two categories according to their tasks. 
Executive Agencies are those Agencies responsible for purely managerial 
tasks, such as assisting the Commission in implementing certain programs. 
These Agencies are subject to strict supervision by the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2002 in Sacchetti, 2009). 
Regulatory Agencies on the other hand are required to be actively involved in 
exercising the executive function by enacting instruments which help to 
regulate a specific sector.  
 
This distinction isn’t helpful. It is too simple according to Sacchetti. A further 
distinction must be made between: 
• Agencies (i.e. EMEA and EFSA) whose function is primarily to provide 
assistance in the form of opinions and recommendations in order to pro-
vide the European Commission the technical and scientific information 
which form the basis for the Commission’s decisions. 
• Agencies (i.e. the EMSA) which provide assistance to the Commission in 
the form of reports, intended to enable the European Commission to meet 
its responsibilities as so-called ‘guardian’ of the Community law. 
• Agencies (i.e. the OHIM, CPVO and EASA) which are empowered to 
adopt individual decisions which are legally binding on third parties (Sac-
chetti, 2009, pp. 6-7). 
 
The main issue, however, is that most Regulatory Agencies do not have 
regulatory tasks at all. EUROFOUND, OSHA, EEA and others only have a 
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mandate to gather information. Indeed, some Agencies were awarded regula-
tory powers, but sometimes these powers were partially lost again to the 
European Commission or to the Member States.  
And further, where do the Union Agencies and Euratom belong in this typol-
ogy? This distinction seems to ignore the existence of the Union Agencies.  
 
The European Commission calls the Community Agencies also Decentralised 
Agencies. This is to separate them from the Executive Agencies which are 
located in Brussels. Executive Agencies have hardly an autonomous status. 
It’s hard to call them Agencies which are meant to have a financial and 
administrative autonomy vis-à-vis the power centre, Brussels, even if they are 




The system of European Agencies is ambiguous and confusing, due to the 
lack of a common framework (Andoura &Timmerman, 2008). Therefore it is 
difficult to give a single definition. The current distinctions are not helpful 
and to the point. Some Regulatory Agencies do not have regulatory tasks. 
The distinction between Community and Union Agencies leads to unclarity. 
It is not transparent. 
 
Important questions are:  
• Should Executive Agencies be regarded as Agencies, because they are 
mostly extensions of the European Commission and hardly autonomous? 
• Should Euratom Agencies be regarded as Agencies, because the status of 
Euratom Agencies is unclear and ambiguous? Does Euratom belong to the 
second pillar? 
• Should the Union Agencies (Common Security and Defence Policy) be 
regarded as Agencies? They are primarily responsive to the Council of the 
European Union. Their status is different from the Community Agencies. 
• Do Agencies have a regulatory task or only an implementory capacity, 





This leads to our first policy recommendation: 
 
1. Stop the division between Communion and Union Agencies which 
leads to intransparency 
 
Our literature review shows that European Agencies lack a single definition 
(Andoura & Timmerman, 2008; Ramboll, 2009). The current distinctions 
(pillar, regulatory/executive; decentralised, typology) are not helpful. For the 
European citizens it is not important whether or not Agencies have communi-
tarian and intergovernmental mandates. The European Commission and the 
European Council should act as one regarding EU Agencies. Don’t make 
them a toy of internal conflict. 
 
Towards a definition  
Papastamkos (2008) has laid the basis for a definition. 
 
• A European Agency is a body governed by European law. 
• It is set up by an act of secondary legislation (regulation/joint ac-
tion/decision) [Why not Treaty based? - See the next paragraph on legal 
issue]. 
• It has its own legal personality. 
• Their task is to inform, research, network, coordinate, prepare policy, 
enforce laws, or a combination of these. The task is laid down by in the 
above act of secondary legislation. 
• It receives a financial contribution from the Community budget. 
• It is a permanent body which is seated in one of the Member States of 
European Union. 
• It has financial and administrative autonomy and is independent in regards 
to the execution of the assigned mission/tasks. 
 
 
1.4 Legal basis of Agencies  
 
The second theoretical issue is the legal basis of Agencies.  
There is no formal definition of what a European Agency exactly is, nor is 
there a single legal framework on which Agencies can be modelled. Agencies 
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are fundamentally different from Treaty-based institutions, such as the Euro-
pean Central Bank, because Agencies are found by means of secondary 
legislation. The oldest European Agency (1958), the Euratom Supply 
Agency, originates directly from the Euratom Treaty. These types of ‘Euro-
pean’ international organisations cannot be considered as being Agencies 
(Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, pp. 3-4). 
 
The Lisbon Treaty (2009) does not provide a specific legal basis to create 
Agencies. Some of our interviewed experts said this is an omission. With the 
Lisbon Treaty taking effect, Agencies will fall under the full jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice (Bovens, 2010, pp. 20). However, this is hardly effecting 
the legal basis of the Agencies.  
 
In the following of this paragraph we show that delegating tasks and powers 
from the European treaty-based institutions and the European Commission 
evokes a number of contentious problems.  
 
In article four of the Treaty of Rome (1957) is stated that each Institution 
(Commission, Parliament, Council) shall act within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty. This has been interpreted by some as a 
prohibition to create additional bodies. However, this has not been prevented 
the delegation of powers to autonomous Agencies. Twelve of the twenty-
three Agencies1
‘If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives 
of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take 
the appropriate measures’ (Treaty of Rome). 
 have the same legal basis: Article 308 of the Treaty of Rome. 
This article states:  
 
Since the third wave of Agencies, new Agencies are predominantly created 
on the basis of a specific Treaty provision. For example, the legal basis of 
 
                                                          
1  CEDEFOP, EUROFOUND, ETF, EMCDDA. EMEA, OHIM, EU-OSHA, CPVO, CDT, 
FRA, EAR and GSA. 
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EEA was Article 130s EC42, which contains the aims of environmental 
protection, and ECHA is based on Article 95 EC, which relates to the internal 
market. The Commission has argued that this should logically be so ‘since 
the regulatory Agency is an instrument of implementation of a specific 
Community policy’.  
However, this vision does not remain unchallenged. In 2004, the UK evoked 
the choice of Article 95 EC as the legal basis of the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) to the European Court of Justice and 
stated that Article 308 EC was the only possible legal basis. The Court ruled 
that the use of Article 95 EC was appropriate for ENISA, as it constituted a 
part of the normative context directed at completing the internal market in the 
area of electronic communications.  
 
Agency creation based on a specific Treaty provisions has three conse-
quences: 
 
• Creating an Agency based on a specific legal basis results in a more flexi-
ble legislative procedure in the Council, because the majority voting pro-
cedure replaces the unanimity voting process.  
• The proposed Agency’s range of activities will probably become narrower 
in the case of a specific Treaty provision than in the case of Article 308 
EC. This is because in the latter case the Council has a large margin of 
discretion about the nature of the Community action it will adopt. 
• The creation of an Agency based on a specific legal basis requires the co-
decision procedure, whereas Article 308 EC only requires parliamentary 
consultation. The power of the European Parliament has thus increased 
since 2000, because it must come to an agreement with the Council on the 
creation of an Agency (Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, pp. 7-8). 
 
Interpreting the Meroni-doctrine 
Agencies are generally provided with a (very) limited mandate: tasks are 
defined technical, scientific or managerial in nature. This limited mandate 
results from the anti-delegation bias following the strict applications of the 
so-called Meroni-doctrine (Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, pp. 9). The EC 
Treaty does not explicitly provide for the formation of Regulatory Agencies, 
nor does it set out the special procedure to this end. Agencies are therefore 
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instituted on the basis of the classic legislative procedures provided by the 
EC Treaty, and thus emerge thanks to the intervention of other EU institu-
tions (Majone, 1999 cited in: Sacchetti, 2009). 
However, the delegation of power is subjected to strict limitations conform 
the Meroni-doctrine, enunciated by the European Court of Justice (European 
Court of Justice, 1958). This case relates specifically to the European Coal 
and Steel Community Treaty (1952), but the Meroni-doctrine is generally 
assumed to be applied mutatis mutandis to all European treaties and to act as 
a rigid barrier to the delegation of regulatory responsibilities to administrative 
bodies, such as European Agencies (Sacchetti, 2009, pp. 9). 
The conservative interpretation of the Meroni-doctrine has extended the 
restrictions of this rather specific case law to the general case of delegation of 
powers. And, in this way, restricting the possibility of instituting EU-wide 
Agencies enjoying effective legislative, executive and judicial powers. In the 
Court’s reasoning, the conditions under which the Commission could dele-
gate certain tasks to administrative Agencies were the following: 
• Delegation might only relate to powers that the Commission itself pos-
sesses. 
• Delegation must relate to the preparation and performance of executive 
acts alone, without the possibility of delegating discretionary powers. 
• The Commission must retain oversight over the delegated competence and 
will be held responsible. 
• The delegation of powers must not disturb the balance of powers among 
the various European Institutions (Sacchetti, 2009, pp. 9). 
 
But the number of European Agencies has continued to grow, forcing the 
Commission to acknowledge the main problems the Agencies are facing, 
such as the incomplete character of their independency and the ambiguity of 
their accountability. 
This had led to inter-institutional working groups (EP, Cie and Council) 
considering the legal basis of European Agencies (European Commission, 
2005, 2008). 
 
In March 2008 the European Commission reinitiated the debate on the role of 
(Regulatory) Agencies within Europe. Because the number of (Regulatory) 
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Agencies has increased, there is a need for a common approach (Cie, EP and 
Council). The following issues are mentioned (European Commission, 2008): 
• Tasks of Regulatory Agencies, one-size-fits-all will not work, but some 
categories are suggested: 1. rule enforcement (CVPO, OHMI, EASA, 
ECHA), 2. support for Europe, technical and scientific advice (EMSA, 
EFSA, ERA, EMEA), 3. operational activities: (EAR, GSA, CFCA, 
FRONTEX, EUROJUST, EUROPOL, CEPOL) 4. collecting, analysing 
and sharing information (CEDEFOP, EUROFOUND, EEA, ETF, 
EMCCDA, EU-OSHA, ENISA, ECDC, FRA, Gender) and 5. service: 
CDT. 
• Structure and working of Agencies (Standards for Board, Director, pro-
gramming). 
• Accountability and tuning with other Agencies. 
• Explicit tasks. 
• Procedures for establishing and finishing Agencies. 
• Communication strategy. 
 
Delegating tasks and powers from the European treaty-based institutions and 
the European Commission evokes a number of contentious problems. Con-





Our literature review shows that European Agencies lack a coherent legal 
basis (European Commission, 2008; Andoura & Timmerman, 2008; Ram-
boll, 2009). Agencies are based on secondary legislation. Although the Lis-
bon Treaty abolished the ‘third pillar’, our expert interviewees said it is a 
missed opportunity to lay a clear legal foundation under the Agencies with 
the Lisbon Treaty. But also on this issue, our interviewees told us: The debate 
on Agencies is far too legal. All discussions lead to legal quicksand. It might 




Our second policy recommendation is:  
 
2. Consider a clear legal foundation under Agencies, preferably Treaty-
based  
 
Agencies lack a single, coherent legal basis. But we also see that this might 
be too ambitious.  
 
Elements of the legal basis could be (European Commission, 2008): 
• Establishment of Agencies (objective, transparent rules). 
• Tasks of Agencies (the whole range is possible). 
• Structure (Board, selection and terms Director, programming, activities). 
• Autonomy/Accounting procedures toward Commission, Council of the 
European Union, European Parliament. 
• Coherent evaluation rules.  
• Procedure for establishment and termination. 
 
 
1.5 Accountability  
 
The third issue of our literature review is accountability. Accountability 
means a relationship between an actor (agency) and a forum (European 
citizens, Commission, European Parliament, and others), in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences. 
There are different forms of accountability (Bovens, 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen 
& Welch, 2010).  
Political accountability means accountability towards elected representatives 
(European Parliament, Council of European Union, and European Commis-
sion).  
Administrative accountability is accountability towards administrative fo-
rums like the Ombudsman.  
Financial accountability consists of audits by the European Court of Audi-
tors. The Court investigates whether the budget implementation has been 
legal and regular. 
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Social accountability means direct and explicit accountability relations be-
tween public Agencies, on the one hand, and clients, citizens and civil soci-
ety, on the other hand (Bovens, 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2010).  
 
The issue of accountability is addressed by: 
• Andoura &Timmerman (2008), the right balance between autonomy and 
accountability. 
• Sacchetti (2009), four elements of accountability. 
• Ramboll (2009), flaws concerning accountability in Agencies. 
• Busuioc (2010), evaluation of four forms of accountability. 
• Groenleer (2009), autonomy versus control of Agencies. 
 
Andoura & Timmerman 
 
European Agencies, especially those with regulatory tasks, can take decisions 
that have substantial consequences. In the light of their autonomous states 
raises the question of accountability: to whom are they answerable? As 
Andoura & Timmerman (2008) state, it is difficult to find the right balance 
between the necessary independence that Agencies should enjoy in executing 
their tasks on the one hand and the required (democratic) control over their 
activities on the other hand (Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, pp. 18). 
It is important to note that formally European Regulatory Agencies are not 
directly accountable to the general public. Therefore, it is important that there 
is a solid system of control in place that prevents an Agency from sidestep-
ping the tasks assigned to it. The Commission, Council, European Parliament 
and European Court are empowered to keep the European Agencies politi-
cally, financially and judicially accountable for their activities. Besides that, 
in ten recent years, other bodies as well have been involved in the oversight 
of activities, such as the Court of Auditors, the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAV) and the financial controller of the European Commission (Andoura 
& Timmerman, 2008, pp. 18-19). 
On the other hand, operational independence is an important prerequisite in 
the functioning of European Agencies: it allows them to perform their tasks 
free from external pressure and operate in the general interest. But, in prac-
tice, the member states and the Commission directly or indirectly influence 
the functioning, for example through the powers granted to them in the 
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nomination process for the administrative board and directors. A way to 
prevent this, is to provide an Agency with a clear internal structure and a set 
of procedures that clearly limit its functions and powers: this forces the 
Agency to focus on its principal tasks and makes external pressure less effec-
tive (Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, pp. 18-19). 
 
It is difficult to find a balance between independence and control regarding 




Sacchetti (2009) set forth that the concept of ‘accountability’ can be subdi-
vided in democratic, budgetary/financial, judicial and procedural accountabil-
ity (Sacchetti, 2009, pp. 16-17). 
An important aspect of the democratic accountability is the fact that the 
European Parliament ultimately decides on the creation and review of the 
Agencies. Concerning the budgetary and financial accountability, the Euro-
pean Parliament (as the budgetary branch responsible for non-compulsory 
expenditure) decides on the allocation. Similarly, the European Parliament is 
the recognized authorised authority for granting discharge in respect of the 
Agency budget, whenever it receives an EU subsidy (Sacchetti, 2009, pp.17).  
 
But, it seems that the European Parliament is not fully aware of its abilities to 




The question of the accountability of Agencies can according to Ramboll be 




European Agencies have only a limited political accountability. Only in a 
few cases, the constituent regulations provide the European Parliament with 
the possibility to invite the director to a hearing before his appointment or to 
report on the Agency’s activities. The European Parliament is gradually 
gaining powers, but is advised to must do more to implement their tasks. 
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Judicial accountability  
The principal mechanism to guarantee judicial accountability of Agencies is a 
review of legality of the Agencies’ acts. All acts taken by European Agen-
cies, capable of producing binding legal effects, are challengeable to the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities on the basis of Article 230 of 
the EC Treaty. Some Agencies are provided with an internal chamber for the 
review of legality of the adopted acts. Decisions of such an internal Board of 
Appeal can be challenged to the Court of Justice. This procedure applies for 
OHIM, CPVO, ECHA and EASA, which are the Agencies with the authority 
to make decisions. Regarding Executive Agencies, administrative appeal is 
treated by the Commission before a possible infringement action is filed at 
the Court of Justice. If the Commission concludes that an act is unlawful, it 
can demand a revision or annulment. 
Financial accountability  
Several control mechanisms exist to make Agencies financially accountable. 
First, the European Parliament has significant power over Agencies through 
its budget and budgetary discharge procedure as many Agencies depend 
completely or partly on Community funding. 
 
Administrative accountability  
The administrative accountability is increasingly safeguarded by the Euro-
pean Ombudsman, who has the power to investigate complaints of malad-
ministration in Agencies. Another way in which Agencies subject themselves 
to administrative control is by agreeing on a code of conduct (e.g. EDA’s 
Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement). 
 
Public control  
Direct public control is carried out by the stakeholders who operate in the 
network set up to assist Agencies. In some cases, stakeholders have been 
given a seat in the administrative board (e.g. ERA). 
 
Ramboll on performance evaluation 
Ramboll (2009) identifies first that in the European Agencies, the directors 
are accountable to the board through the approval of annual reports, and often 
to the Parliament through the discharge procedure. According to Ramboll, 
accountability means that European Agencies have to report on their accom-
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plishments, and that they incur risks if these accomplishments are considered 
as unsatisfactory. The executives of the Agencies should be held accountable 
for both regulation and performance. It is in any case much easier to identify 
who is responsible for regulatory problems than performance ones.  
Thus, accountability for performance is therefore a notorious difficult issue 
(Ramboll, 2009, pp. 22-23). 
 
Ramboll on internal audit function 
Until 2003, all Agencies were responsible for their own internal audit func-
tion. By this date, and under strong parliamentary pressure, the so-called 
Internal Audit Service of the Commission became responsible for playing 
this role on behalf of the Agencies, except in the case of the CPVO and the 
OHIM. For comparison: in the Commission, internal audit reports are re-
viewed by a high level Audit Committee, which includes external experts and 
which holds frequent meetings. This provides an arena for discussing, possi-
bly challenging, and most often using the audit conclusions. But, this reflect-
ing system does not exist in the case of the European Agencies. It is therefore 
the joint responsibility of the director and the board of the Agencies to use 
the audit conclusions. In fact, as Ramboll signals, the boards cannot really 
play this role at a significant level because most board members are experts 
in the Agency’s core business, but they do not have the competence and 




Ramboll (2009) concludes that the Agency’s periodic evaluations tend to 
cover only a limited number of issues, i.e. relevance, coherence, Community 
added value, and internal efficiency. And, they fall short of concluding on 
rationale, effectiveness (for example, in achieving policy objectives), and 
cost effectiveness or external efficiency. Ramboll suggests that there are three 
main reasons for these findings: 
• The political profile of the evaluations is too low to attract the evaluation 
of management issues. 
• A serious reconsideration cannot put on the political agenda every five 
years: Agencies cannot, for example, develop a long-term vision if their 
mandate is changed and challenged every five years.  
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• Evaluators have difficulties in assessing many results and impact at time, 
which means that they can conclude on a specific activity, but not as well 
of the whole range of activities of an Agency, which may be wide (Ram-
boll, 2009, pp. 25-26). 
 
The bulk of periodic evaluation efforts fall short of concluding on results and 
impact and therefore add little value in terms of accountability. 
 
Ramboll, finally, identifies five problems concerning the accountability of 
European Agencies: 
• The ownership and use of so-called ‘internal audits’ are problematic. 
• Performance reporting has not yet the strong and accurate form which 
could serve as a basis for the discharge procedure. 
• The bulk of evaluation efforts apply to periodic Agency evaluations which 
add little value in terms of accountability for results and impacts. 
• At presents, the powerful force of the discharge procedure makes Agency 
directors accountable for regularity, but not for performance. 
• And, finally, a point which has not yet been clarified sufficiently is the 
need to hold the Commission accountable for its interactions with the 
Agencies, but not for the activities of the Agencies that are independent 
bodies (Ramboll, 2009, pp. 26-27). 
 
Ramboll generally advises seven options for improvement of European 
Agencies:  
• Reconsidering Agencies periodically. 
• Merging small Agencies with larger ones where relevant. 
• Improving the transparency of seating conditions. 
• Providing administrative support to new Agencies. 
• Establishing an inter-agency audit and performance committee. 
• Developing inter-agency comparisons. 
• Alleviating administrative burdens. 
 
What is lacking are clear output and outcome indicators. Control is based on 






Busuioc confirms the analysis of Ramboll with her research. In 2010 Busuioc 
conducted a promotion research on accountability of European Agencies. 
European agencies are enveloped in a complex web of accountability rela-
tions to a multiplicity of forums (political bodies, citizens, boards). She 
distinguishes between managerial, political, financial and (quasi)-judicial 
accountability. 
 
1. Managerial accountability 
The nearest and most direct accountability relation is that vis-à-vis the man-
agement board of the Agency. Busuioc finds that some delegations to the 
boards are well prepared, and an overwhelming number are not the vigilantes 
that they are officially meant to be (pp. 206). All in all, the supervision of the 
management boards displays a broad range of failings (pp. 207). These gov-
ernance and accountability problems depicted often reflect the inherent EU 
tensions and struggles for competing, legitimate interests between the EU 
level and the national level.  
Many board delegations have not fully stepped up to the challenge and due to 
either generic shortcoming or other reasons, fall short in many cases of ade-
quately holding directors to account and comprehensively assessing the 
performance of the Agency (pp.208). 
 
2. Political accountability  
This takes form of reports and hearings with European Parliament and Coun-
cil of the European Union being able to enact consequences towards Agen-
cies within their remit (pp. 208). 
Political accountability is on the rise, particularly in the case of the European 
Parliament as we have seen earlier (Sacchetti, Ramboll). All in all, Busuioc 
concludes: political accountability is an important element of Agencies’ 
accountability, but not a sufficient one (pp. 209). 
The European Parliament gained more authority, but is not that powerful as 
represented. The discharging power is regarding only regularity, not output or 




3. Financial accountability  
Agencies are subject to an extensive and complex system of financial ac-
countability (pp. 210). These accountability arrangements follow the three 
steps of an accountability process: information, debate and the possibility of 
consequences. The last element is largely informal, as most financial forums 
lack the possibility to impose outright sanctions. Busuioc is positive about the 
financial accountability, although there might be an overload (costs) and the 
performance issue (output and outcome) is not addressed. The focus of the 
discharge process is almost exclusively on regularity; aspects relating to 
agencies’ results and performance are generally not addressed (pp. 212). 
 
4. (Quasi-) Judicial accountability  
The Courts of Justice and the European Ombudsman are both important 
avenues for redress against Agency decisions (pp. 214). 
 
The research of Busuioc (2010) underlines and details the flaws Ramboll 
found. The control is one-sided financially. On paper it seems sufficient, but 
when one inspects in detail there are many deficiencies.  
 
Groenleer on autonomy 
 
The autonomous status of EU Agencies also gives rise to questions concern-
ing their accountability. If EU Agencies are autonomous, to whom are they 
answerable? Our discussion here is mainly based on the dissertation of Gro-
enleer (2009). EU Agencies are meant to be autonomous. They contribute to 
the EU’s implementing capacity, fulfilling a need for independent technical 
expertise and scientific knowledge (pp. 344).  
 
Groenleer starts his dissertation with the formal design of Agencies. What is 
put on paper by their creators in regards to their powers and controls is likely 
to shape their development. He shows in his research that the differences 
between EU Agencies outweigh their similarities. His description of the 
formal design raises many interesting points regarding their autonomy (Gro-
enleer, especially Chapter 6, pp. 115-140): 
• Community Agencies are more autonomous with respect to the Member 
States than the Union Agencies (Defence and Security Agencies). These 
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Agencies, in turn, are more autonomous with respect to the Commission 
than Community Agencies. Community Agencies are part of the first pillar 
in which policy making has many supranational characteristics, whereas 
Union Agencies fall under the second pillar in which policy making is es-
sentially intergovernmental in nature.  
• Agencies are more autonomous when their regulations expressly state they 
are independent. 
• The mandates of the Agencies differ. Some have predominantly advisory 
functions with several broad categories. Some are tripartite organisations. 
Most EU Agencies, whether Community or Union, have no independent 
decision-making powers.  
• The tasks and objectives of EU Agencies differ. Some Agencies have seen 
their tasks being expanded. But often leaving their budget at the same 
level.  
• The management Board’s composition raises the question whether Boards 
of Agencies should be considered part of the Agency or part of their exter-
nal environment.  
• Boards of Agencies fulfil an important role as interface between the 
Agency and its environment.  
• In some Boards of Agencies external stakeholders are represented, but 
often without the right to vote.  
• Directors of Agencies have organised themselves into the Heads of EU 
Agencies Network. They convene so that their voice is heard more clearly.  
• The Agencies’ staff has grown steadily since the first wave of Agency 
creation. The Parliament has on several occasions been highly critical on 
the ‘unguided growth’ (Grässle, 2008). 
• Most Community Agencies are financed from the general EU budget. 
Union Agencies receive contributions from member states. A few Agen-
cies are entirely or partially self-financed (Medicines, Harmonisation of 
Internal Market, Aviation Safety Agency).  
• The Commission only seems to be willing to exert control over the Agen-
cies when this yields political gain; in other circumstances, such as during 
their practical set-up, the Commission denies responsibility for the Agen-
cies. 
• The European Parliament has budgetary and informational powers. 
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• Member states control Agencies through their representatives in the man-
agement boards. EU Agencies often rely heavily on the cooperation of na-
tional authorities in their policy areas; this must make them responsive to 
the demands of national authorities and their governments.  
 
In general, Groenleer finds that EU Agencies do not possess a high level of 
formal autonomy, neither in respect of the Commission nor in respect of the 
Member States. We believe that this autonomy is relative. In the end the 
European Commission stays responsible for the work and decisions taken by 
EU Agencies. That’s why the European Commission controls Agencies via 




The authors we discussed above differ on details sometimes, but they all 
believe that the practice of accountability regarding EU Agencies can be 
improved. The accountability mainly has a financial character and focuses 
only on whether the money is spend legal and regular. Financial accountabil-
ity doesn’t look at the performance or the effectiveness (output and outcome) 
of the Agencies. The board members should be more active in controlling the 
Agencies. They are are primarily defending their own States interest (regain 
influence through the Agencies which in an earlier stage was 'lost' to Europe) 
and should place the common interest first.  
Accountability has improved since the nineties of the last century, but still 
there is a lot to do. What is needed is social accountability, a culture of learn-
ing. Needed for this are outcome indicators. Europe should leave the culture 
of Eurospeak and the Eurocrats behind and aim for an open and innovative 
culture.  
 
The most important point found is that until there is a clear legal basis for the 
EU Agencies, the European Commission is responsible for the actions and 
decisions of EU Agencies. The autonomy of EU Agencies (Decentralised and 
Executive Agencies) is in fact based on a myth. They have some discretion-
ary power, but in the end the European Commission is responsible. For the 
Union Agencies (intergovernmental bodies) this is unclear.  
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The two policy recommendations are: 
 
Hold the European Commission accountable for the functioning of the 
Communitarian (Community and Executive) Agencies 
 
The literature review (Ramboll, 2009; Busuioc, 2010; Groenleer, 2009; 
Sacchetti; 2009; Papastamkos, 2008) showed that it is often unclear to whom 
the Agencies are politically accountable: the Council of the European Union, 
the Commission or the European Parliament. Agencies have to produce 
annual reports, work programmes, activity plans, finance reports, evaluation 
reports which suggest control by the European Commission, the Council of 
the European Union or the European Parliament. These documents are not 
visibly used by the Commission, Council of the European Union or European 
Parliament to steer (Ramboll, 2009). There is no transparency. There is a lot 
of influencing but it is not clear in what way.  
Ramboll identifies five problems: 
• Performance reporting is almost nonexistent 
• The discharge procedure is limited to regularity 
• Audits are not sufficiently owned and used 
• Directors’ accountability is limited in scope 
• The Commission is sometimes made accountable for what is beyond its 
responsibility. 
Most Agencies believe that they are accountable to their own Board. Board 
members of the Agencies, however, are often not the vigilantes they are 
supposed to be (Busuioc, 2010). The European Parliament incidentally made 
use of their discharging power (Busuioc, 2010). 
 
Agencies (Decentralised and Executive) are meant to be autonomous from 
the Commission, but in the end the European Commission is responsible for 
their actions. Unless a clear legal basis is made. The European Parliament 
should hold the European Commission accountable for the work of the 
Community and Executive Agencies. When the European Commission 
becomes the Daily Executive Board of the European Council, then the Coun-
cil is accountable.  
Union Agencies are accountable to Member States and the Council. National 
parliaments should take action.  
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European Parliament make more use of your present rights 
 
The European Parliament has formally gained a larger foothold in Agency 
oversight on a par with the increase of its legislative powers. The European 
Parliament has discharging power over the Directors of Agencies. However, 
the European Parliament only used this instrument once (CEPOL). For regu-
larity reasons it was delayed but finally voted. Ramboll (2009, pp. 23) says 
the discharge procedure is limited to regularity. 
The study of Busuioc (2010) and Groenleer (2009) showed that the fora don’t 
execute their tasks and powers sufficiently. They don’t ask the right ques-
tions, or they ask them too late. ‘While some EP committees demonstrate 
interest and are involved with the Agencies within their remit, others display 
a low level of involvement and a very low attendance during hearing meet-
ings (Busuioc, 2010a).  
Now the European Parliament has gained more powers (information and 
discharging power budgets) there has been more effort put into. However, the 
European Parliament did not bite yet. Some say Members of the European 
Parliament do not show up when the directors of the Agencies give informa-
tion to the European Parliament. The deadlines to act are strict, this hinders 
the European Parliament. According to Schillemans (2009) the oversight of 
the parliament is always focused on a limited number of politically salient 
issues, which could bring risks with it.  
 
The European Parliament should have powers during the whole process:  
• Drafting budgets. 
• Drafting annual work plans. 
• Controlling.  
• Discharging on financial and social indicators.  
 
The European Parliament has requested the Commission to devise clear 
benchmarks for comparing cross-agency results (Papastamkos, 2008). The 
European Parliament should go on on this way. Higher standards are needed 






The literature review is focussed on an overview of the European Agencies, 
the best definition, the legal basis and the accountability. Our findings show 
that there is a lot of information on EU Agencies, but it is unclear.  
There is no formal definition of what an European Agency exactly is, nor is 
there any single legal framework on which all Agencies are modelled.  
Although on paper there is much accountability, the practice of accountability 
must improve. Financial accountability doesn’t look at the performance or 
the effectiveness of the Agencies. Output and outcome indicators are neces-
sary for improvement. 
 
On the basis of the literature review three policy recommendations are formu-
lated: 
• Stop the division between Communion and Union Agencies which leads to 
intransparency. For the European citizens it not important whether Agen-
cies have communitarian or intergovernmental mandates. European Com-
mission and European Council should act as one in regards to the govern-
ing of EU Agencies.  
• Consider a clear legal foundation for Agencies, preferably Treaty-based. 
This is very complicated but our interviewees told us that an opportunity is 
missed with the Lisbon Treaty. Agencies lack a coherent legal basis.  
• Hold the European Commission accountable for the functioning of the 
Communitarian (Community and Executive) Agencies. The European Par-
liament representing the citizens should hold the European Commission 
accountable for the functioning of the Decentralised and Executive Agen-
cies. In the end the Commission is responsible for all decisions taken by 
these Agencies (unless there is a clear legal basis). 
• European Parliament make more use of your present rights. The European 
Parliament has gained more powers (information and discharging power). 
Address the Commission on the functioning of Decentralised and Execu-















For the case studies two Agencies have been selected. Because education, 
health and labour belong to the main research topics of the ITS we have 
chosen for: 
• Education, Audiovisual and Cultural Executive Agency (EACEA), Brus-
sels, Belgium. 
• European Agency for Safety and Health at work (OSHA), Bilbao, Spain.  
The client agreed with our choice. 
 
We have a Community Agency and an Executive Agency. The results cannot 
be representative for all Agencies. 
 
Design 
By studying two European Agencies in-depth we are able to show how the 
current process of accountability works. We focussed, based on the research 
questions 3-9, on six issues: 
• Establishment of Agency - How was the Agency established (history, ad-
hoc, political bargaining, interest groups, transparency)? 
• Tasks - How is the task of the Agency defined (tasks, powers, consistency, 
coherence)? 
• Political accountability - to who are Agencies politically accountable 
(European Parliament, Council of the European Union and European 
Commission)? 
• Social control - Who is involved (how, effectively)? 
• Administrative accountability - Complaints to European Ombudsman 
(how many, what kind)? 
Financial accountability - ((Lack) transparency in general (budget control, 
efficiency). 
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Both case studies will start with factual information on the Agency: 
• Year of establishment. 
• Budget. 
• Number of employees. 
• Board. 
 
Then we will pay attention to the task and establishing (history) of the 
Agency. The term transparency is in the European context also used for the 
(in)transparency in the establishing process of the Agencies. We see this in 
the third research question (To what extent are Agencies established in a 
transparent manner?). We will address the establishment of OSHA and 
EACEA in the case studies.  
Transparency in general is the active disclosure of information by an organi-
zation that enables external actors to monitor and assess its internal workings 
and performance. Transparency is the basis for accountability processes. This 
side of the transparency issue is addressed with research question 8: To what 
extent are the current budgets controls transparent? 
 
Next we will pay attention in the case studies to accountability. Accountabil-
ity means a relationship between an actor (agency) and a forum (European 
citizens, Commission, European Parliament, and others), in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences. we 
will address four forms of accountability (Bovens, 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen 
& Welch, 2010): 
Political accountability towards elected representatives (European Parlia-
ment, Council of European Union).  
Administrative accountability towards administrative forums like the Om-
budsman.  
Financial accountability consists of audits by the European Court of Audi-
tors.  
Social accountability towards clients, citizens and civil society.  
 
We used information from literature. Most Agencies are periodically evalu-
ated and these evaluation reports gives much information. Internet is used 
and interviews are held mainly with Dutch liaison officers and specialists 
(see research design).  
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We start with a description of the two agencies in keywords. 
 
 
Figure 5 – OSHA and EACEA in keywords 
 OSHA EACEA 






15 million Euro 
 
70 posts 
Board 84 (tripartite) 
Director, Bureau supports Board 
2006 
administrative 49.5 million Euro 
operational budget 600 million Euro 
432 employees 
Director, Head of Department and 10 
operational units (managing pro-
grammes) and 3 horizontal units 
(HR, finances, IT), Internal Audit 
Capability, Steering Committee: 5 
members of Parent DGs 
Task Collecting, analysing, sharing 
knowledge and information, promot-
ing culture of risk prevention 
Mandate is informational 
Managing community projects 
throughout their life cycle 
 




Issue of safety and health had long 
history. After decision about location 
European Bank other Agencies were 
established. ‘Package deal’ 
Mainly driven by constraint on 
employment on Commission 
Political 
accountability 
Not clear toward Council and EP. 
Discharge procedure.  
OSHA is primarily accountable to 
Governing Board.  
Ritual accounting. Window dressing 
 
EACEA works in cooperation with 
and close supervision of the Euro-
pean Commission. Periodic coordina-
tion meetings, Internal Audit Service 
Formally to Commission, but in fact 
supervision of Commission is quite 
limited (Court of Auditors) 
Social control Tripartite, employers’ associations 
and unions represent companies and 
workers  
Experts are primarily repr. of 
member states 
Satisfaction survey of both applicants 
and beneficiaries.  




European Ombudsman received a 
few technical complaints of employ-
ees  
European Ombudsman received a 
few technical complaints of appli-
cants 
Steering Committee, Court of Justice 
Financial 
accountability 
Strict financial control, , ‘Every 
pencil needs a receipt’ 
Effectiveness hard to measure 
Strict financial control, balance 
between costs and controls 




The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (OSHA) was estab-
lished by Council Regulation no. 2062/942
The primary aim of the Agency is to provide the Community institutions, the 
Member States and the stakeholders in the field with technical, scientific and 
economic information about safety and health at the workplace through: 
 in July 1994.  
• Collecting. 
• Analysing. 
• Sharing knowledge and information.  
• Promoting a culture of risk prevention.  
 
 
OSHA has a budget of EURO 15 million and employs 70 people. OSHA has 
a Director appointed by the Governing Board. The Board has 84 members 
from Member States (27), employers’ associations (27) and unions (27) as 
well as 3 representatives of the European Commission. The Bureau (11 
members) supports the Board and monitors Board’s decisions. 
 
 
2.2.1 Establishment - How was the Agency established?  
 
OSHA is established in 1994. The Agency is located in Bilbao in Spain and 
was set up in 1996. After the accession of Spain to the European Union (1986 
together with Portugal) it was clear that Spain wanted an Agency. After the 
European Bank was established in Frankfurt (1994) - this was the most 
important institution to have - the further establishment of decisions to locate 
Agencies could start. From 1993 - 1996 several Agency were established 
(OHIM, Alicante, Europol The Hague, EMEA (London), EMCDDA (Lis-
bon), CPVO (Angers), CdT (Luxemburg).  
 
Discussions regarding safety and health at the workplace across Europe took 
place before the establishment of OSHA. There were always questions like: 
Are legislative measures needed and what was the usefulness of common 
 
                                                          
2  With further amendations Regulation no 1643/95, 1645/2003 and 1112/2005. 
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standards to enhance safety and health? Discussions about prevention of 
long-term diseases were coming up already in the seventies and eighties of 
the last century.  
Companies and Member States want to realise a fair level playing-field on 
issues regarding safety and health in the workplace. 
 
OSHA is one of the Agencies who has a tripartite distribution in the Board, 




2.2.2 Task  
 
The Agency carries out four main tasks (Ramboll/Euréval/Matrix, III, 154): 
1. Communication and awareness rising (campaigns, producing promotion 
and technical working environment material). 
2. Identification of new and emerging risks (making thematic reports, fore-
casts, surveys, seminars, workshops). 




The main work of the Agency is collecting, editing, improving and distribute 
information about safety and health on the workplace.  
 
Networking activities aims at linking the OSHA resources scattered across 
Europe and consists of meetings, information exchange and similar activities. 
The focal points have a central function.  
 
There is a clear division of tasks between the Agency and the Commission as 
the latter is responsible for the legislative process for the adoption of EU 
Health and Safety at Work legislation and monitoring this process.  
OSHA provides information, exchanges examples of best practices between 




Employers and employee organisations 
Tensions between the interests of employer and employee organisations are 
not reported during our interviews with representatives of employers’ asso-
ciations and union representatives. The main task of OSHA, as they brought 
forward, is getting and circulating information. There are no policy issues 
where competing interest of employees and employers show up. During the 
Board meeting the different groups in de Board sub convene to discuss the 
agenda. Consensus between government, employee and employer representa-
tives is (most of the time) the result. The possible conflicting aspects (policy, 
legislation on safety and health) are deposited elsewhere (European Commis-
sion, Advisory Committee in Luxemburg). Concrete legal measures on safety 
and health are made by the Advisory Committee or the European Commis-
sion itself.  
However, getting to the consensus involves often a long process where dif-
ferent representatives have very different opinions. For OSHA it is essential 
to have the backing from all four groups (governments, unions, employers’ 
associations, Commission) to have an impact. This is necessary to implement 
decisions afterwards using the networks.  
 
Coherence in tasks of Agencies 
The task of OSHA seems to duplicate with that of EUROFOUND the Euro-
pean Foundation for the Improvement of Living and working conditions. 
EUROFOUND in Dublin was established in 1975. 
However, our interviewed experts stress to say that differences are big: 
• The issues of EUROFOUND (market relations, quality of life) are much 
broader than those of OSHA (safety and health on the workplace).  
• The main activity of EUROFOUND is (coordinating) research. OSHA 
conducts no research. OSHA is about collecting information and distribut-
ing information. In EUROFOUND work researchers, in OSHA work tech-
nical hands-on safety and health experts and communicators.  
From the first sight there might seem an overlap between the tasks and work 




There is no conflict with the task, for instance, the International Labour 
Organisation in Genève (ILO). The work of ILO (the right of workers to 
strike) is different from that of OSHA.  
 
 
2.2.3 Political accountability 
 
The establishing Council Regulation (2062/94) makes clear that it is the 
Governing Board of OSHA which holds the Director of OSHA accountable, 
together with the European Parliament and the Council. In the Establishing 
Council Regulation OSHA is responsible for making annual reports, work 
programs, evaluation reports, budget, and financial accounts. Even after 
reading this Regulation several times it stays unclear what the status is of 
these documents vis-à-vis the Council and the Parliament. The work pro-
gramme is adopted by the Board after consultation with the Commission. The 
final budget is adopted by the Board once the budgetary authority (EP and 
Council) has decided on the EU budget. Sometimes the European Commis-
sion adds earmarked money for special projects.  
Informally there is more accountability through consulting (see also Busuioc, 
2010). There are many informal networks where Board members consult 
their rank and file, where employers’ associations and trade unions, compa-
nies and users are consulted. But, it is not transparent.  
The Council and the European Parliament have rights (budget discharching 
power towards the Director, interviewing directors of Agencies). The Euro-
pean Parliament is not pro-active in executing their powers, because they 
have had no reasons to do so.  
Although the European Commission is the main partner of OSHA (budget, 
planning) also the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union are parties to which OSHA is to a certain extent accountable.  
The approval of the own Board of OSHA is the most important obstacle to 
pass. The interviewees think that OSHA is only accountable to their own 
Board. Once the annual work programs, budgets and financial accounts are 




2.2.4 Social control 
 
The main goal of OSHA is raising public awareness of safety and health 
issues on the workplace. Important beneficiaries are individual companies, 
workers, safety coordinators and personnel managers involved in improving 
occupational safety and health. The research showed that key target groups 
are intermediate organisations. These are for instance authorities, unions, 
employers’ associations or sector organisations in the Member States who are 
involved in policies concerning safety and health (maintenance, building 
sector). The sector organisations discuss safety and health measures in their 
sector.  
 
The tripartite composition is mentioned as giving a helping hand in the work 
of spreading information. If measures are taken by the European Commis-
sion, or campaigns are started by OSHA, it is important to have the support 
of the social partners to implement this in the Member States.  
OSHA does research on who visits the web sites and how many times.  
 
An important asset of OSHA are the focal points. These are the representa-
tives in the 27 Member States. The Dutch focal point is located at the De-
partment of Social Affairs and Employment and is de facto located at TNO (a 
Dutch research company). The Dutch focal point employs two people.  
The focal point has the liaison-function between OSHA and the Member 
States. They collect, analyse and spread National Information to OSHA and 
disseminate OSHA information at the national level. Good practices are 
promoted to OSHA and vice versa.  
 
The main activities of the Dutch focal point are: 
• Website (50.000 visitors yearly). 
• Organising three meetings a year with 100-150 visitors per meeting. 
Visitors are mostly representatives of intermediate or sector organisations. 
• Publish information in the professional press about safety and health 
issues.  
 
The external evaluation of OSHA carried out by the Centre for Strategy & 
Evaluation Services (CSES) in 2006/2007 addresses much attention to the 
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focal points (FOP’s). The evaluation has a character of congratulations to the 
FOP’s. However, some challenges can arise for the FOP’s if national plans 
diverge from the Agency plans. (CSES, iii, advice 9). Also Groenleer (2009) 
mentions tensions in Agencies in general considering focal points. Some 
focal points are stronger in representing the interests of their country than the 
interests of Europe. Also OSHA has to deal with this issue. Since the 
enlargement of the EU it has become increasingly difficult to ensure that the 
Agency’s priorities always coincide with national ones (CSES, pp. iii). 
It is hard to say, even on the basis of this research, whether the activities of 
OSHA reach the public or whether the awareness is rising concerning safety 
and health on the workplace. The Agency has almost 50.000 subscribers to its 
newsletter. In a survey on the subscribers 90 percent believed that the work 
of OSHA contributed to higher awareness. In 2009 there were over 30 mil-
lion pages viewed on the web-site and there were more than 2 million unique 
visitors.  
 
The focus is on representatives of the Member States (civil servants), em-
ployers’ associations and trade unions. Interviewed persons mention the 
catalysing function of OSHA, and the tripartite composition.  
 
In the OSHA-Strategy 2009-2013 (EU-OSHA, 2008) attention is paid to 
measuring progress and assessing performance. This serves to: 
• Demonstrate accountability to OSHA stakeholders. 
• Identify lessons from past activities. 
• Develop an ‘evaluation culture’. 
The developed indicators however are targeted on outcomes and impacts on 
users and not on the European citizens. It is a start.  
 
Advisory and expert groups  
Basically the Agency has two kinds of groups providing it with expert ad-
vice. At the strategic level (long-term planning of issues) there are the Advi-
sory Groups in the areas of the European Risk Observatory, Working Envi-
ronment Information and Communication, Campaigning and Promotion. 
These groups involve members of the Board and give the Agency advice on 
how to implement the work programme and feedback on activities developed 
according the work programme. 
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At the operation level there is what is called Expert Groups. These groups 
consist of people with a special expertise in the relevant area and help the 
Agency implement the work programme – for example by validating findings 
or facilitating access to relevant data. The number of expert groups varies 
over time because they are established depending on the priorities in the work 
programme and the need for expertise input in the implementation.  
 
Expertise is provided through a number of other channels as well, such as via 
the Agency’s Topic Centres (a consortium of leading European OSH Insti-
tutes), via Stakeholder Consultations and via contractors.  
 
The main advantage of involvement of expertise advice at the strategic level 
is that this ensures the relevance and usefulness of the Agency’s activities to 
key beneficiaries and stakeholders. Relevance and usefulness are necessary 
conditions for meeting the objectives of the Agency and having an impact on 
occupational safety and health in Europe. At the operational level the experts’ 
input helps identifying the relevant data resources for the Agency’s projects 
and ensures a high quality of the products. It also brings along the side-effect 
that the Agency’s work is promoted among a very relevant audience.  
 
The members of the Advisory Groups are selected by the interest groups and 
the Commission in the Board and are therefore representative of the Board. In 
addition the Agency appoints 1-2 members depending on the group. Where 
the Agency appoints two members one of them will represent the Topic 
Centre. As in regards to the Agency’s Expert Groups, membership depends 
on the project and the need for expertise. However, in general the Agency’s 
focal points (one in each Member State and EEA state) appoint members to 
the groups and the groups therefore have representation of the key network 
for implementation of the work programme, the focal point network.  
 
The issue of representation is a highly political one. And in the area of em-
ployment and social policy there is a long existing tradition of tri-partism 
between governments, unions and employers’ associations. The tradition is 
reflected in the structure of OSHA. OSHA works with a wide range of stake-
holders, but the formal structures are built on tri-partism. The activities of 
OSHA try to be relevant to the target audiences and beneficiaries. This in 
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most cases comes back to the workplace and the two parties represented there 
– workers and employers.  
The issue of ‘consumer interests’ is important, but occupational safety and 
health is primarily important to workers and employers. The direct impact on 
consumers of occupational safety and health is not so obvious. The Agency’s 
policy on this is implemented via its stakeholder consultations where those 
affected by an activity are involved.  
 
Representation 
The Advisory Groups mainly represent the interest groups and Commission 
in the Board. Each interest group appoints two members to each Advisory 
Group. There are two employee, two employer and two governments’ repre-
sentatives in each group.  
The ‘Expert Groups’ are mainly made up of Member States’ representatives. 
There are, however, also social partners and Commission representatives. 
And in some cases, others are represented.  
In terms of numbers: There are three Advisory Groups and at this moment 
around four active expert groups. Their background is not registered. But 
they do, to a large extent, represent ‘users’ as the information developed will 
at some points have to be used at the workplace by workers and employers.  
 
 
2.2.5 Administrative accountability 
 
We have studied the files of the European Ombudsman. We found two deci-
sions on two direct complaints on OSHA. These complaints dated from 
1998/2000.  
The first complaint was about an employee of OSHA who claimed that the 
local staff regulations should be applicable to his work contract base on 
Commission’s regulations. The Ombudsman decided the complainer was 
right.  
The second was a complaint by local staff on the issue of grading. On short 
notice the complaint was cancelled by the complainers themselves. 
The OSHA is mentioned six times, but detailed inspection showed it con-
cerned general or other Agencies and OSHA was only involved indirectly.  
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2.2.6 Financial accountability  
 
OSHA has a budget of 15 million euro. About 70 people work at OSHA in 
Bilbao. Not all of them have a contract for an indefinite period of time. 
Administrative and operational costs are 50/50 percent. However, the admin-
istrative costs include mainly staff costs doing operational tasks. So, it is not 
possible to compare the administrative and operational cost with EACEA, the 
next case in our study. Good comparable figures lack.  
Governance costs are 1.35 percent of OSHA’s budget.  
With the actual figures it is impossible to compare Agencies on financial 
indicators. The European Commission has to act.  
 
Given the task of OSHA 15 million is not considered much by most inter-
viewees. OSHA produces a lot for this amount of money: 






The European Court of Auditors has few remarks: . ‘ 13. ….. According to 
the accounting information, approximately two million euro of the appropria-
tions carried forward corresponds to activities not yet implemented at thet 
year end. This situation indicated delays in the implementation of the activi-
ties financed from Title III of the Agency’s budget and was at odds with the 
budgetary principle of annularity.  
14. Appropriations carried over from 2008 amounting to 0,7 million euro, or 
18 % (compared to 10 % in 2008), had to be cancelled. The increased can-
cellation rate again indicates the need for stricter application of the annu-
larity principle by the Agency’ (European Court of Auditors, 2010, 
(2010/C338/09).  
There is an indication for the need for stricter application of the annularity 
principle by the Agency. Not all activities are implemented at the years' end.  
 
It is clear also that the European Court of Auditors only studies whether the 
money is spend in a regular and legal way. The Court does not say whether 
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the money is spend efficiently: Could we do the same with less money? 
Neither the effectiveness is studied.  
Performance indicators only are not enough.  
 
 
2.2.7 Summary OSHA 
 
Strong points OSHA  
 
Clear task, information 
OSHA produces information on the issue of safety and health on the work-
place. Although the exact contribution of OSHA to raising consciousness 
cannot be pinpointed, the issue of safety and health on the workplace has got 
more attention in Europe than 30 years ago. It remains unclear whether this is 
the result of national policy or the work of OSHA.  
 
Improvement points OSHA 
 
Efficiency not measured 
The efficiency of OSHA is not measured, so it is hard to say whether OSHA 
is efficient or not. Currently with its 27 Member States the Board is com-
posed inefficiently. OSHA has taken measures already: organising, when 
possible, its Board meetings in connection with the meetings of the Advisory 
Committee meetings in Luxembourg; have a Bureau taking care of the daily 
oversight of activities.  
 
Representation  
Why tripartite when policy on safety and health is made elsewhere? OSHA is 
a regulatory Agency but has no regulatory tasks. Of course, tripartism is 
important to generate adoption. The question is whether all 27 countries have 
to be presented in the Board.  
 
Because of the non-political task of OSHA could reconsider the composition 
of the Board of OSHA. Why can’t representatives of Member States, em-
ployees and employers roulate. Every half year the Presidency of the Euro-
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pean Union roulates. A tripartite representation of five Member States which 
roulates in every five years.  
 
Involvement of public/users 
Given the core task of raising consciousness in the public, the public is un-
derrepresented in the Board, the focal points and in the activities.  
The organization of OSHA is top-down. First are the interests of member 
states, employers and employee organisations.  
The focal points could do more to address issues relevant to the public.  
 
Because of the primary task of OSHA, raising awareness, the prime focus in 
the Board composition should be on users and public. The Agency should be 
a service organisation to the European citizens in the field of safety and 
health on the workplace.  
FOPs could do more to address issues relevant to public.  
 
An obstacle for OSHA is that they are too dependent on political consensus. 
Given the mandate of information gathering and spreading their autonomy 
vis-à-vis Member States and the European Commission should be strength-
ened focussing on one issue: improving safety and health on the workplace 





The Education, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) is estab-
lished and operational from the beginning of 2006. It took over the pro-
gramme management from the Technical Assistance Offices (TAOs) and the 
Commission. EACEA was the first big Executive Agency to be established. 
The objective of the Executive Agency is to manage community projects 
throughout their lifecycle. The beneficiaries vary substantially from educa-
tion institutions to non-governmental and government organisations and 
enterprises (COWI, pp. 13). 
 EACEA is located in Brussels. Staff numbers have increased from 278 
persons in 2006 to 376 in 2008 and 432 in 2010. The operational budget in 
2010 was 600 million Euro and the administrative budget 49.5 million Euros.  
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The management of EACEA is composed of a Director and Head of Depart-
ment, with ten operational units and three horizontal units. EACEA is man-
aged by the Steering Committee and the Director. The Steering Committee is 




2.3.1 Establishment - How was the Agency established?  
 
Until 2006 four centralised programmes of DG Educations and Culture (DG 
EAC) as well as two strands of the Media programme of DG INFSO were 
managed by three Technical Assistance Offices (TAO’s) and the European 
commission. According to the reform of the Commission (2000 onwards), it 
was decided to phase out the TAO’s because it was considered that pro-
gramme management by privately owned entities, such as the TAO’s, was 
raising issues of reliability and transparency. Alternatives available at the 
time were either to establish an Executive Agency to which programme 
management would be delegated, or to internalise these tasks in the Commis-
sion (all-Commission option). A cost-benefit assessment (2004) showed that 
the creation of an Executive Agency was preferable to outsource programme 
management to private law entities and to the all-Commission option (COWI, 
Internal Evaluation of the AECEA, pp. 5). According the European Court of 
Auditors (2009, pp. 17) the ‘Commission’s assumption is that savings are 
achieved by recruiting 75 % proportion of contract staff instead of permanent 
officials at the Agencies.’ 
 
The European Court of Auditors (Special report 13/2009) finds that: 
‘1. The initiative of setting up the Executive Agencies was mainly driven by 
constraints on employment within the Commission rather than being 
based on the intrinsic features of the programmes themselves. 
2. The cost-benefit analyses (CBA’s) required by the legislation in order to 
support the decision to create the Agencies took little account of nonfi-
nancial aspects and omitted some important factors on the side of costs. 
The picture provided, though undeniably positive from a financial point of 
view, was not entirely accurate. The contribution of the CBA’s to the de-
cision-making process was rather limited.’ 
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Because the Commission was not allowed to grow in size, Executive Agen-
cies were created to increase specialisation of programme management and to 
offer a better and more cost-efficient service to programme participants.  
 
 
2.3.2 Task  
 
The task of EACEA covers tasks related to the management of projects 
throughout their lifecycle, in particular operations required for launching and 
concluding grant procedures, including calls for proposals, evaluation and 
selection of projects, financial commitments, notifications to applicants, 
entering and modifying agreements, contracting, monitoring of projects, 
execution of payments, and other contacts with beneficiaries (COWI, pp. 5). 
 
The initial task (in terms of years) of EACEA has been extended progres-
sively over the period 2007-2008. The extension of the mandate was neces-
sary to cover the new generation of programmes 2007-2013 as well as the 
new initiatives on the external dimension of projects in the field of education.  
In 2007, the programmes managed by the Agency came from three parent 
DGs. The parent DGs now are EAC, DEVCO and COMM.  
 
The Agency provides an umbrella for the internal and external higher educa-
tion programmes of the Community, providing a uniform management sys-
tem and acts as a single interlocutor for the higher education institutions and 
beneficiaries (COWI, pp. 6).  
 
Executive Agencies, like EACEA, are Agencies responsible for purely mana-
gerial tasks, such as assisting the Commission in implementing programs 
(European Commission, 2002). EACEA is subject to strict supervision by the 
European Commission. Due to their executive role, the tasks of the Executive 
Agencies do not involve any political decision making or policy develop-
ment.  




The Commission’s supervision of the Agencies’ work [all five Executive 
Agencies] is quite limited: 
• The annual work programmes (subject to the Commission’s approval) are 
scarcely used for setting targeted objectives.  
• The monitoring is mainly focused on indicators related to how the tasks 
are carried out rather than to the results produced. 
• The reports are usually confined to budgetary execution and omit to 
measure progress made on a multi-annual basis and identify corrective 
actions of the future. 
This remark of the Court of Auditors is made for all Executive Agencies. The 
report of the Court does not give rise to the adoption that EACEA is excluded 
from these findings.  
EACEA appears to be under strict supervision by the European Commission, 
but the European Court of Auditors places question marks.  
 
 
2.3.3 Political accountability 
 
The Executive Agencies work in cooperation with and under supervision of 
the Commission. The Agency has autonomy in the field of managing the life 
cycle of projects, but depends on the Commissions’ political orientations, the 
definitions of the programme priorities and budgets (COWI, pp. 14).  
 
EACEA is under close supervision of the Commission. The Agency is ex-
actly what it is, executing the rules and priorities of the Commission. It’s 
autonomy in directing policy is nihil.  
 
After hearing the opinion of the Court of Auditors, The Council of the Euro-
pean Union and the European Parliament issue a specific discharge on the 
accounts of the Executive and Regulatory Agencies. Council and Parliament 
are informed about award decisions. Both are informed about the activities 





2.3.4 Social control 
 
In 2007 - the first year with a new generation of programmes - EACEA 
received nearly 9.000 applicants in total and selected close to 4.100 appli-
cants for funding.  
The Agency’s analyses shows that the main challenges facing applicants are 
to: 
• Understand the purpose of the call for proposals. 
• Understand the procedures. 
• Pay attention to details. 
• Plan the preparation of the application in an appropriate manner. 
 
The Agency is communicating in various ways with the potential and se-
lected applicants and beneficiaries: 
• Website. 
• Events. 
• Information sessions. 
• Individual feedback. 
• Help desk. 
• Mail box. 
 
Appendix 11 of the COWI-evaluation contains a survey under applicants and 
beneficiaries about their satisfaction with EACEA.  
Those whose proposals were accepted were more satisfied with the transpar-
ency of the principles of the selection procedure than those who were re-
jected. It is concluded that there is room for improving the communication of 
principles of selection, since some respondents have difficulties understand-
ing them. 
The survey shows that beneficiaries are mostly satisfied about the transpar-
ency, accuracy, and timeliness during the implementation process.  
The beneficiaries were mostly satisfied with the overall programme manage-
ment. This specific question however was only posed to the beneficiaries not 
to the applicants who were rejected a subsidy. They didn’t reach to the im-
plementation phase, but now comparison is impossible.  
The overall satisfaction with the service of EACEA (and its predecessors) 
improved over the years (2003-2005, 2006 and 2007-2008).  
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In the interviews we did for our research EACEA is by some heralded for its 
clear and efficient rules. However two interviewed are clearly very critical, 
representatives of employers and employees. They criticize the Executive 
Agencies in general. The programs are set up from the perspective of the 
government, ministries, ministers and politicians. They want to spend money 
legitimately and controllable on the target. Preferably the Agencies make 
regulations which are executable, controllable and payable from the perspec-
tive of the government than from the perspective of the the multicoloured 
reality. Users, as the interviewed say, consider the rules as ‘made behind the 
desk’, by lawyers and accountants with far too much accountability. Only 
those can apply that are able to handle these rules and regulations. 
Monitor committees, monitoring these processes, can help and can lead to 
adjustments, the interviewed advice. But this also leads to more bureaucracy.  
 
Mentioned are are also the valorisation studies of EACEA. These are mainly 
targetted at improving the programmes but can give an indication of the 
outcome of EACEA.  
 
Is the public involved? 
The target group of EACEA is not specifically the public in general. The 
programmes of EACEA are targeted at higher education institutions, univer-
sity researchers, redeployment of workers, audiovisual companies and per-
formers and cultural institutions and performers.  
The topic of citizenship could be more directed towards the public.  
 
Nevertheless, an important question is whether the European citizens know 
and feel that the programmes EACEA manages are improving their lives. Is 
our global educational position improved? Do European audiovisual and 
cultural performers get better chances? Does the handling of EACEA im-
prove the accessibility of the programmes? 
The European Commission should measure the effectiveness with output and 





2.3.5 Administrative accountability 
 
Citizens of a Member State of the Union or people who reside in a Member 
State can make a complaint to the European Ombudsman. Businesses, asso-
ciations or other bodies with a registered office in the Union may also make a 
complaint to the Ombudsman. 
 
Since 2005 five complaints were made against EACEA. It is not possible in 
this study to describe all cases in detail. Most of them concern issues of 
applications and payments. In all cases the Ombudsman stopped his inquiry 
prematurely. In some cases a settlement was agreed before the Ombudsman 
had to decide.  
 
In most cases EACEA gets compliments from the Ombudsman because of 
the acceptance of the Ombudsman’s friendly solution proposal and its will-
ingness to settle the complaint.  
 
EACEA is further accountable to the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors 
and the Internal Audit Service of the European Commission.  
 
 
2.3.6 Financial accountability  
 
As the EACEA task broadened (longer en more programs) the budgets of 
EACEA has grown also. In 2009 the administrative budget (Agency’s costs) 
was 44 million Euro (2010 49.5 million Euro) and the staff number has 
increased up to 400 persons.  
The operational budget (programs) managed by EACEA increased from 283 
to 600 million Euro in 2010. The ratio of administrative cost compared to the 
operational budget has decreased steadily over the 2006-2008 period from 9.4 
to 7.6 percent (COWI). 
 
COWI concludes that EACEA has shown an improved level and quality of 
services and that the Agency is cost-effective.  
Further COWI looked at relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. EACEA 
functions in accordance to the Act of Delegation and to the Modalities for 
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cooperation between the supervisory DGs and the Agency. There is no over-
lap of tasks between the Agency and the Commission. Nevertheless, there are 
areas with need for further clarity between the tasks of Agency and Commis-
sion, according to COWI. This issue is addressed in the action plan drawn up 
after the COWI evaluation. The division of tasks and responsibilities have 
subsequently been clarified for staff and management.  
 
EACEA is, according to COWI who is looking at regular-effectiveness, 
effective since it achieved the objectives set in 2006 and 2007 work pro-
grammes. But also, COWI concludes that the different structures of the 
Annual Management Plan (AMP) and the Annual Activity Report (AAR) 
make it difficult to assess the extent of objective achievement for the Agency. 
The structures of AMP and AAR have now been aligned.  
Efficiency can be improved by simplification and harmonising internal pro-
cedures (joint databases, system harmonisation, IT systems, etc.). Many 
measures have been taken to simplify internal procedures. 
 
With a ratio of administrative costs of 7.6 percent EACEA seems to be effi-
cient.  
The evaluations of COWI and the European Court of Auditors show however 
that this is purely financial.  
The Court found that there were indeed cost savings stemming from the 
prevalence of lower paid contract staff. But the actual amount of the savings 
depends also on the redeployment of the Commission staff that were previ-
ously doing the work of the Agency. The Court concludes that the lack of 
reliable information on the ex ante situation at the Commission does not 
allow the extent of the savings to be verified.  
 
 





Although the interaction of the Agency with applicants and beneficiaries can 
be improved EACEA seem to be rewarded by them.  
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Improvement points  
 
Establishment 
Although the service of the Agency has improved compared to the predeces-
sor the establishment of EACEA was mainly driven by constraints on em-
ployment within the Commission rather than being base on the intrinsic 
features of the programmes themselves, the European Court of Auditors 
claims. EACEA claims the Agency was established with a view to improve 




On the one hand, EACEA is subject to strict supervision by the European 
Commission. The periodic reports do contain, according to EACEA, a full set 
of performance indicators that relate to the objectives.  
On the other hand the European Court of Auditors states that the Commis-
sion’s supervision is quite limited. What is lacking is supervising by setting 
results-oriented and targeted objectives, using a limited number of relevant 
performance indicators which form the basis for next years’ objectives (Court 
of Auditors, executive summary).  
 
Social accountability 
Purely financially everything seems to be all right. There is however little 
information about the efficiency of EACEA. Could we achieve the same 
result with less money?  
Also, the attention for social accountability is lacking. What advantage does 
the European citizen take from the activities of EACEA? Do the programmes 
of EACEA improve education, innovation, culture, audiovisual performance? 
Is Europe more competitive through education and innovation vis-à-vis Far 
East and United States and upcoming economic spheres? 
These are evaluation questions European citizens pose. We did not find 





2.4 Policy recommendations 
 
The main findings of the case studies are: 
• The establishment of Agencies is intransparent. 
• Citizens are underrepresented in the Boards of Agencies. 
• Control on Agencies has a financial character. 
• Budget control is mainly on regularity and not on efficiency and effective-
ness. 
• There is a lack of research on the effectiveness and efficiency of Agencies 
(output and outcome measures). 
The case studies provide for another six Policy Recommendations. 
 
1. Make the establishment of Agencies transparent 
 
The establishment of European Agencies is often the result of political ‘horse 
trading’ or ‘package deals’ (Ramboll, 2009; Groenleer, 2009). The two case 
studies, the interviews and the literature review made this clear. It should be 
made more objective why an Agency is established.  
 
Most Agencies have an undetermined duration, except the two cases of EAR 
and ENISA which have been established for a five year period (Ramboll, 
2009, pp. 20).  
There is a general understanding that Agencies need to be evaluated every 
five years with an aim to reconsider their mandate or even their very exis-
tence. This view is stated in the specific financial regulations of many Agen-
cies, and it is sometimes made explicit in the founding regulations. An analy-
sis of the current practice shows that the periodic Agency evaluation do not 
have a high enough profile for leading to a serious reconsideration of an 
Agency, and even less to its closure (Ramboll, 2009, pp. 20). 
Ramboll identified five problems: 
• Alternatives to the Agency option used to be paid limited attention but the 
recent impact assessment practices achieves a better transparency, al-
though not yet perfect, especially in regards to governance and seating ar-
rangements. 
• There is no effective mechanism for reconsidering established Agencies. 
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• Once the host country is selected, the remaining options are taken through 
bilateral discussions, with quite uneven outcomes and negative transpar-
ency. 
• With the exception of ECHA, the most recently established Agencies have 
not benefited from sufficient guidance, support, and transfer of lessons 
learnt with regards to administrative issues. 
• The evaluation team considers that the critical mass issue is not yet as-
sessed in sufficient depth in the impact assessment.  
 
2. Represent the European citizen in the Agencies 
 
Agencies should be guided by the interest of the ‘European citizen’. (Com-
munity) Agencies have a community task. They, like all European institu-
tions, do something for European citizens. The research of Groenleer (2009) 
shows that Member States in the Board often put national interest first. The 
power that individual Member States have lost to the Commission is some-
times recovered by Member States through participating in the Agencies 
(Groenleer 2009; Egeberg & Trondal, 2010).  
Our literature review (Bovens, 2008; Groenleer, 2009; Busuioc, 2010) shows 
that European citizens are hardly represented in the European Agencies. 
Representatives of Member States often represent the vested interests of 
individual Member States. What is lacking is a vision about the interest of the 
European citizen. This vision must be strengthened.  
 
Suggestions to represent the interest of the ‘citizens’ in the Agencies: 
• Chief Citizen Officer. Mrs. M.L. Vos, ex-member of the Dutch Parliament 
of the Labour Party, advised a Chief Customer Officer in the Board of 
Banks (2010). European citizens are not represented in the Boards of 
Agencies.  
• Client councils, client fora. Involvement of citizens (customers, clients) 
can be regarded as a way to improve the quality of Agencies (Schillemans, 
2009). Customer Councils and customer forums can provide useful feed-
back about the activities of public organisations from the experience of 
clients or customers. The primary importance of client councils and cus-
tomer forums is that they direct recipients of a service a voice in the ser-
vice and help spread the word to give to their experiences with the service. 
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Customer Councils and generate customer forums, such as customer satis-
faction surveys, targeted surveys, focus groups and suggestion boxes, in-
sight into the views, wishes and experiences of citizens (stakeholders). 
• Visitation of professionals and citizens. Visitation by professional (col-
league Agencies) or representatives of citizens of Agencies can give in-
formation on the effectiveness of the output of the Agency (Bovens, 
2009). A direct and explicit accountability relation between public Agen-
cies and clients, citizens and civil society is possible by putting the results 
of visitations on the internet. It can provide ways to improve the function-
ing of Agencies. 
• Ombudsman. The European Ombudsman can have an important role to 
involve the citizens and to represent interests of European citizens in the 
functioning of the European Agencies.  
 
3. Agencies must be social accountable 
 
EU Agencies are heavily controlled financially by the European Commission. 
This is a basis, but not enough. No accountant warned the European citizens 
for the financial risks of banks, the housing crisis or the consequences of 
public overspending. We see no studies on the efficiency of the Agencies: 
Could we achieve the same result with less money? 
 
The European Agencies should be held accountable to the European citizen 
(What have we done for you?), the interest groups (workers, employers, 
sectors). We agree, it’s hard to imagine the ‘interest of the European citizen’.  
 
We offer a few examples: 
• What did the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) do for travellers? 
Do we have one European Aviation Safety area or are there still compe-
tency claims with safety risks for travellers? 
• What did the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) do for the European 
citizens? Are European citizens protected against dangerous chemical sub-
stances or are the interests of chemical companies guarded by this 
Agency?  
• What did the European Police Office (EUROPOL) do to prevent tough 
criminals to cross the border and start over? In the Netherlands we have 
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the example of a child abuser in a day care center who was convicted in 
Germany already for the same transgression. Prevention of these kind of 
criminals is what the citizens expect of Europe. 
• What did the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Train-
ing (CEDEFOP) do to make free movement of citizens possible through 
the recognition of diploma's and certificates? Recognition of diploma's is 
still an obstacle to free movement of citizens than conducive to it. Euro-
pean policy has not been able to lift the obstacles because national inter-
ests prevailed. The European Qualifications Framework (European Com-
mission, 2008a) might offer new possibilities.  
 
The dogma should be: 
What did the European Agency do for the European citizen?  
 
We agree that this is a tough question which is not always easy to answer. 
But there should be a better balance between citizens, Member States and the 
earlier mentioned Eurocrats. 
 
4. European citizens should be more involved in the operation of Euro-
pean institutions in general  
 
The two case studies show that complaints at the Ombudsman are seldom 
submitted by citizens. Also in administrative accountability citizens should 
be more visible.  
 
Administrative institutions should address the interest of the European citizen 
more specific.  
 
5. Budgets should be awarded more responsive 
 
The literature review (Busuioc, 2010; European Court of Auditors, 2009) and 
the two case studies showed that budgets are mostly automatically extended. 
There is sometimes informal consultation between Director and the European 
Commission on the budget but this in intransparent. Checks and balances are 
below par. There is a lot of financial accountability but it hardly gives a view 
on efficiency: could we have achieved the same result with less money?  
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The controls might be sufficient but they are not democratic (do the citizens 
take advantage of it?) or transparent (make clear how efficient and what 
effects are created with the money). Neither the Commission, nor the Euro-
pean Parliament use their discharging powerfully to change budget or to 
redirect budgets. Informal contacts between Directors and Commission have 
influence but these are intransparent.  
 
A greater role should be awarded to the Council of the European Union and 
the European Parliament in regards to spending on Agencies.  
 
6. Do research on effectiveness of Agencies 
 
Our research (literature review and case studies) points to the fact that no 
research is done that examines the effectiveness of European Agencies. The 
European Court of Auditors does not answer that question.  
Our case studies found that the Agencies are working on performance indica-
tors. This is a start. But it is not enough to shed light on the effectiveness of 
Agencies. This compels for a new, mature and innovative culture in the 
(management of the) Agencies. It is not easy to measure effectiveness. Inter-
vision can help to come up with new ideas.  





The two case studies of the study are not representative for the functioning of 
the EU Agencies. Nevertheless, they reveal that the establishment of Euro-
pean Agencies is not transparent. The accountability and control of Agencies 
shows shortcomings.  
From our model of social accountability we see that the European citizens are 
hardly ever represented in the Boards of the Agencies. The work in Agencies 
is oriented towards policy-making in the Member States. The control of 
Agencies by the European Commission is primarily financially oriented. An 
evaluation based on effectiveness and efficiency is lacking because there are 
no output or outcome measures. Evaluation is on regular effectiveness.  
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On these findings six policy recommendations were formulated: 
• Make the establishment of Agencies transparent. The establishment of 
European Agencies is often the result of political ‘horsetrading’ or ‘pack-
age deals’. It should be made more objective why an Agency is estab-
lished.  
• Represent the European citizen in the Agencies. The ‘citizen’s interest’ is 
hardly ever represented in the Boards of the Agencies. The interest of the 
citizen should be leading. 
• Agencies must be social accountable. Most control of the European Com-
mission now is one-sided financially oriented. Financial accounting gives 
little information on the performing en effectiveness on Agencies. Needed 
is a change from a bureaucratic to a more innovative, open culture. The 
introduction of social accountability focuses on participation, empower-
ment, generating and evaluating alternatives, evaluation on effectiveness 
and learning. 
• European citizens should be more involved in the operation of European 
institutions in general. The culture in European institutions is bureaucratic, 
legalistic and oriented towards policy-making in the Member States. 
Europe should get back in the hearts and minds of its citizens by being ac-
countable to them. 
• Budgets should be awarded more responsive. There is a lot of financial 
control towards Agencies. Still a clear, transparent overview on efficiency 
lacks. Too often budgets are automatically extended. The culture is focus-
sed on control, not on learning. 
• Do research on effectiveness of Agencies. Not only attention for efficiency 
is needed, also the effectiveness must be studied. The discussion on Euro-
pean Agencies is far too legalistic. We need more information about the 
outcome of Agencies. The European Commission should develop a good 
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Annex 1: Research design 
 
 
Dennis de Jong, member of the European Parliament for the Dutch Socialist 
Party (SP), invited the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (ITS) of the 
Radboud University Nijmegen to do research on EU Agencies. The objective 
of the research is to:  
• Esteem the current level of accountability and efficiency  
• Make policy recommendations.  
There is mountain of information on the functioning of European Agencies, 
but the policy recommendations lack. 
 
De Jong asks the following: 
 
Definition and legal basis 
1. How to best define EU Agencies, in light of the lack of a single conclu-
sive definition?  
2. What is the legal basis of EU Agencies? And what are the main changes 
under the Lisbon Treaty? 
 
Establishment of Agencies 
3. To what extent are Agencies established in a transparent manner?  
 
Political and democratic accountability 
4. How does the sharing of powers and mandates in reality take place be-
tween Agencies, the Commission and the European Parliament? Who is 
responsible for what, when and how? What is the legal and practical 
status of decisions taken by Agencies?  
5. How are Agencies currently political accountable and to what extent are 
Agencies contributing to democratic accountability?  





Administrative accountabi lity 
7. To what extent are complaints being made to the European Ombudsman 
in relation to Agencies and what have they led to so far? (Administrative 
accountability) 
 
Financial accountability and transparency 
8. To what extent are the current budgets controls sufficient, democratic and 
transparent?  
9. To what extent have the Agencies conducted their activities efficiently 
and achieved their objectives in a cost-effective manner?  
 
To answer these questions we did four research activities: 
• Literature review. 
• Two case studies. 




A. Literature review 
 
The literature review is focussed on an overview of the European Agencies 
and three topics based on the research questions: 
• What is the best definition of the Agencies? 
• What is de legal basis of the Agencies? 
• What is the accountability of the Agencies? 
 
 
B. Case studies 
 
Sample  
For the case studies two Agencies have been selected. Because education, 
health and labour belong to the main research topics of the ITS we have 
chosen for: 
• Education, Audiovisual and Cultural Executive Agency (EACEA), Brus-
sels, Belgium. 
• European Agency for Safety and Health at work (OSHA), Bilbao, Spain.  
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The client agreed with our choice. 
 
The case studies are based on evaluation studies, interviews with key figures, 





To draw policy recommendations we interviewed key figures. Some were 
interviewed primarily concerning the cases.  
 
List of interviewed Dutch experts 
 
drs. M. Blomsma  Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
prof. dr. M. Bovens Utrecht University 
prof. dr. N. Groenendijk University of Twente, President of the 
European Community Study Association 
dr. M. Groenleer  University of Delft 
mr. H. Goudsmit  Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
drs. M. den Held Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
dr. H. Koëter Retired, former director of EFSA  
hr. B. Koning Employer representative 
drs. A. van der Leest Employer representative, Metall union  
mr. M. van Mierlo  Employer representative, VNO-MKB 
prof. dr. P. Peters Member of Dutch Senate for Dutch  
Socialist Party 
mr. A. Ploegmakers MA Former Union representative  
dr. Th. Schillemans Utrecht University  
mr. H. Schrama  Focal point Netherlands  
drs. W. van Veelen Union representative 
mevr. prof. dr. E. Versluis University of Maastricht 
 
Three interviewed experts wanted to stay anonymous but delivered useful 






Our focus in this research is on social accountability which is promoted by 
theorists like Vosselman and Bovens (Vosselman, 2006; Bovens, 2007; 
Vrieze, Marx, De Gier & Van Esch, 2007). In our current study we make a 
distinction between classic and modern social accountability (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1 – Typology of accountability 
 Classic accountability Social accountability 
Forum  Political, legal, administrative  Public, citizen, professions 
Way Financial  Effectiveness, results 
Direction Top-down Bottom-up 
Measuring Narrow (quantitative) Rich (quantitative and qualitative) 
Character Procedural, ritual, intransparent, 
window dressing 
Content, what works 
Perspective Controlling Learning 
Interaction  Principal-agent Partnership 
Culture Bureaucratic Innovative 
 
 
In our theoretical view the European Union is losing trust because it is rely-
ing too much on classical accountability which leads to an intransparent, 
procedural bureaucracy. The functioning of the European Agencies should, 
according to these theorists, be characterized by a focus on participation 
(public, citizen, professions), empowerment (bottom-up), generating and 
evaluating alternatives (quantitative and qualitative measuring), evaluation of 
effectiveness (content, what works), improving (learning), listening and 
being supportive (partnership) and change from a bureaucratic to a more 






Annex 2: European Agencies  
Agency Date of Creation & Legal 
Source 
Description of activities 
CEDEFOP: European 
Centre for the Develop-
ment of Vocational 
Training – Thessaloniki 
10 February 1975 - Regula-
tion (EEC) 337/1975 
 
To promote a European area of lifelong learning throughout an enlarged EU, 
by providing information on and analyses of vocational education and 
training systems, policies, research and practice 
EUROFOUND: European 
Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions – 
Dublin 




To provide information, advice and expertise – on living and working 
conditions, industrial relations and managing change in Europe – for 
key actors in the field of EU social policy on the basis of comparative 
information, research and analysis 
ETF: European Training 
Foundation – Torino 
7 May 1990 - Regulation 
(EEC) 
1360/1990 
To contribute to the development to the vocational training systems in 
partner countries and to facilitate dialogue amongst stakeholders by 
developing international, national and local networks 
EEA: European Environ-
ment Agency – Copenha-
gen 
 




To provide sound and independent information on the environment 
and environmental policies and to develop and coordinate the 
European environment information and observation network (Eionet) 
EMCDDA: European 
Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction 
– Lisbon 
 




To gather, analyse and disseminate objective, reliable and comparable 
information on drugs and drug addiction and, in so doing, provide its 
audiences with a sound and evidence-based picture of the drug 
phenomenon at European level 
EMEA: European Medi-
cines Agency – London 
 




To perform the scientific evaluation of applications for European 
marketing authorization for medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use 
 
82 Agency Date of Creation & Legal 
Source 
Description of activities 
OHIM: Office for 
Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs) – 
Alicante 
20 December 1993 - Regula-
tion (EC)40/1994 
 
To register and manage the applications for the Community trade mark and 
the Community registered design 
EU-OSHA: European 
Agency for Safety and 
Health at Work – Bilbao 




To develop, analyze and disseminate information to improve 
occupational safety and health in Europe and to develop a 
comprehensive network with national focal points, European 
institutions, European social partners, and international organisations 
CPVO: Community Plant 
Variety Office – Angers 
27 July 1994 - Regulation 
(EC) 
2100/1994 
To implement and apply a system for the protection of plant variety Rights 
CdT: Translation Centre 
for the Bodies of the 
European Union – Lux-
embourg 
28 November 1994 - Regula-
tion (EC) 
2965/1994 
To provide the translation services required by the institutions, bodies 
and Decentralized Agencies of the European Union 
EUROPOL: European 
Police Office – The Hague 
 
18 April 2008 - Regulation 
not yet 
published in the Official 
Journal of the 
EU. 
(original: 26 July 1995 – 
Convention) 
To help member states co-operate more closely and effectively in preventing 
and combating organised international crime by facilitating the exchange of 
information between Europol and Europol Liaison Officers, providing 
operational analysis and supporting member states’ operations, providing 
expertise and technical support for investigations and operations carried out 
within the EU and generating strategic reports and crime analysis on the basis 
of information and intelligence supplied by member states or gathered from 
other sources 
FRA: European Union 
Fundamental Rights 
Agency – Vienna (Before: 
EUMC: European 
15 February 2007 - Regula-
tion (EC) 168/2007 
(2 June 1997 - Regulation 
(EC) 
To provide Community institutions and member states with information, 
assistance and expertise on fundamental rights when implementing commu-
nity law, and to support them in taking measures and formulating appropriate 
courses of action 
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Agency Date of Creation & Legal 
Source 
Description of activities 
Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia) 
1035/1997) 





15 November 1999 - Regula-
tion (EC) 2454/1999 
To manage the main EU assistance programmes in Serbia and Montenegro 
(Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro, UN administered Kosovo) and 
FYR of Macedonia 
ISS: European Union 
Institute for 
Security Studies – Paris 
20 July 2001 - Council Joint 
Action 
2001/554/CFSP 
To help create a common European security culture, to support the strategic 
debate by organising research and debate on security and defence issues that 
are of importance to the EU and to create a network of academics, officials, 
experts and decision-makers in order to provide a forward-looking analysis 
on security and defence issues 
EUSC: European Union 
Satellite Centre - Torrejon 
de Ardoz 
20 July 2001 - Council Joint 
Action 
2001/555/CFSP 
To support the decision-making of the European Union by providing analysis 
of satellite imagery and collateral data 
EFSA: European Food 
Safety Authority – Parma 
28 January 2002 - Regulation 
(EC) 
178/2002 
To collect and analyze scientific data, identify emerging risks and provide 
independent scientific advice on all matters with a direct or indirect impact on 
food safety, including animal health and welfare and plant protection 
EUROJUST: The 
European Union’s Judicial 
Cooperation Unit - The 
Hague 
28 February 2002 - Council 
Decision 
2002/187/JHA 
To enhance the effectiveness of the competent authorities within member 
states when they are dealing with serious cross-border and organised crime, 
to stimulate and improve the coordination of investigations and prosecutions 
and to support the member states in order to render their investigations and 
prosecutions more effective 
EMSA: European Mari-
time Safety 
Agency – Lisbon 




To assist the Commission and the national authorities in matters of maritime 
safety, security and the prevention of pollution caused by ships, to control the 
proper application of EU law in this field and to promote cooperation be-
tween national authorities 
 
84 Agency Date of Creation & Legal 
Source 
Description of activities 
EASA: European Aviation 
Safety 
Agency – Köln 
 




To provide technical expertise to the European Commission by assisting in 
the drafting of rules for aviation safety and to carry out the certification of 
aeronautical products and organisations involved in their design, production 
and maintenance, which help to ensure compliance with airworthiness and 




Agency – Heraklion 
 




To advise and assist the Commission and the member states on information 
security and to address security-related problems in hardware and software 
products in dialogue with industry, to collect and analyze data on security 
incidents in Europe and emerging risks, to promote risk assessment and risk 
management methods to enhance our capability to deal with information 
security threats, to exchange best practices and to track the development of 
standards for products and services on network and information society 
ECDC: European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and 
Control – Stockholm 
 




To enhance the capacity of the Community and the member states to protect 
human health through the prevention and control of human disease, to act on 
its own initiative when outbreaks of contagious illnesses of unknown origin 
threaten the Community and to ensure complementary and coherent action in 
the field of public health by bringing together the member states, the EU 
Institutions and the 
relevant international organisations 
ERA: European Railway 
Agency – 
Lille/Valenciennes 
29 April 2004 - Regulation 
(EC) 
881/2004 
To reinforce safety and inter- operability of railways throughout Europe 
GSA: The European 
Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems Supervi-
sory Authority – Unde-
cided (provisionally in 
Brussels) 








Agency Date of Creation & Legal 
Source 
Description of activities 
EDA: European Defence 
Agency – Brussels 




To improve the EU’s defence capabilities, especially in the field of 
crisis management, to promote EU armaments cooperation, to assist in 
the development and overall re- structuring of the European defence industry 
and to promote EU defence-related Research and Technology 
FRONTEX: European 
Agency for the Manage-
ment of Operational 
Cooperation at the 
External Borders – 
Warsaw 




To coordinate operational cooperation between member states in the field of 
management of external borders, to assist member states in the training of 
national border guards, to strengthen border security by ensuring the coordi-
nation of Member States’ actions in the 
implementation of Community measures relating to the management of the 
external borders and to promote overall coherency by liaising with other 
Community and EU partners responsible for the security of the external 
borders 
CFCA: Community 
Fisheries Control Agency 
– Vigo 
 




To organize operational coordination of fisheries control and inspection 
activities by the member states and to assist them to cooperate so as to 
comply with the rules of the Common EU Fisheries Policy in order to ensure 
its effective and uniform application 
CEPOL: European Police 
College – Bramshill 
20 September 2005 - Council 
Decision 2005/681/JHA 
 
To encourage cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime, mainte-
nance of public security and law and order by organising courses, seminars 
and conferences with senior police officers from across Europe 
ECHA: European Chemi-
cals Agency – Helsinki 
18 December 2006 - Regula-
tion (EC) 
1907/2006 
To manage the registration, evaluation, authorization and restriction proc-
esses for chemical substances, to ensure consistency in chemicals manage-
ment across the EU and to provide technical and scientific advice, guidance 
and information on chemicals 




86 Agencies under preparation (Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, p.33) 
Agency Date of Creation & Legal 
Source 
Description of activities 
EIGE: European 
Institute for Gender 
Equality – Vilnius 
 
20 December 2006 - Regula-
tion (EC) 1922/2006 
 
To contribute to and strengthen the promotion of gender equality and the fight 
against discrimination based on sex, to collect, analyze and disseminate relevant, 
objective, comparable and reliable information as regards gender equality, to raise 
EU citizens’ awareness of gender equality and to set up and coordinate a European 
Network on Gender Equality 
 
 
Proposed Regulatory Agencies (Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, p.33) 
Agency Date of Creation & Legal Source Description of activities 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (unknown) (unknown) 
European Electronic Communications Market Authority (unknown) (unknown) 
Source: Andoura & Timmerman, 2008  
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European executive Agencies (Andoura & Timmerman, 2008, p.33) 
Agency Date of Creation & Legal 
Source 
Description of activities 
PHEA: Executive Agency 
for the Public Health 
Programme – Brussels 
15 December 2004 - Decision 
2004/858/EC 
 
To support actions to improve and protect human health in the EU 
EACEA: Education, 
Audiovisual and Culture 
Executive Agency – 
Brussels 
14 January 2005 - Decision 
2005/56/EC 
 
To implement the Community funded programmes and actions in the 




Network Executive Agency 
– Brussels 
26 October 2006 - Decision 
2007/60/EC 
 
To manage the projects and events for the promotion of the Trans- European 
Transport Network 
EACI: Executive Agency 
for 
Competitiveness and 
Innovation – Brussels 
(Before: IEEA) 
31 May 2007 - Decision 
2007/372/EC 
To manage the projects and events funded under Intelligent Energy - Energy 
Europe programme and to disseminate the resulting knowhow and best 
practices 
ERC: European Research 
Council Executive Agency 
- Brussels (Under prepara-
tion) 
14 December 2007 - Decision 
2008/37/EC 
 
To stimulate scientific excellence in Europe by supporting and encouraging 
the very best, truly creative scientists, scholars and engineers 
REA: Research Executive 
Agency – Brussels  
14 December 2007 - Decision 
2008/46/EC  
To evaluate the proposals and manage the research projects of the current 
research framework programme FP7 
Source: Andoura & Timmerman, 2008 
 
88  3: Community Agencies (Ramboll, 2009) 
 
Agency  









Type of  
governance 
Main category of  
activity 
Stage in  
lifecycle 
CEDEFOP  1975  Thessaloniki (GR)  EAC  122  18  94%  Tripartite  Soft coordination   
EURO-
FOUND  
1975  Dublin (IE)  EMPL  87  21  100%  Tripartite  Information   
ETF  1990  Torino (IT)  EAC  124  19  96%  Standard  Service and support  Changing  
EEA  1990  Copenhagen (DK)  ENV  167  37  86%  Standard  Information   
EMEA  1993  London (UK)  ENTR  547  183  25%  Standard  Individual applica-tions  
 
EMCDDA  1993  Lisbon (PO)  JLS  99  14  93%  Standard  Information   
CdT  1994  Luxembourg (LU)  DGT  189  42  0%  Users and MS  Service and support   
EUOSHA  1994  Bilbao (ES)  EMPL  64  15  93%  Tripartite  Communication   
CPVO  1994  Angers (FR)  SANCO  45  13  0%  Standard  Individual applica-tions  
 
OHIM  1994  Alicante (ES)  MARKT  705  318  0%  Standard  Individual applica-tions  
 
EUROPOL  1995  The Hague (NL)  JLS  408  65  100%  Member States  Operational coordin.  Changing  
EAR  2000  Thessaloniki (GR)  ELARG     Standard  Service and support  Closed  
CEPOL  2000  Bramshill1 (UK)  JLS  32  9  100%  Member States  Soft coordination   
EUROJUST  2002  The Hague (NL)  JLS  172  20  100%  Member States  Operational coordin.   
EFSA  2002  Parma (IT)  SANCO  395  66  100%  Expert  Expert advice   
EMSA  2002  Lisbon (PO)  TREN  179  50  100%  Standard  Operational coordin.   
EASA  2002  Köln (DE)  TREN  440  85  35%  Standard  Individual applica-tions  Growing  
ECDC  2004  Stockholm (SE)  SANCO  195  40  98%  Standard  Information   
ERA  2004  Lille (FR)  TREN  113  18  100%  Standard  Expert advice   













Type of  
governance 
Main category of  
activity 
Stage in  
lifecycle 
FRONTEX  2005  Warsaw (PL)  JLS  185  70  97%  Standard  Operational coordin.   
CFCA  2005  Vigo (ES)  MARE  47  9  78%  Standard  Operational coordin.  Growing  
GSA  2005  Brussels (BEL) TREN  52  11  100%  Standard  Service and support  Changing  
ECHA  2006  Helsinki (FI)  ENTR  219  66  95%  Standard  Individual applica-tions  Growing  
FRA  2007  Wien (AU)  JLS  55  15  100%  Expert  Information   
EIGE  2007  Vilnius (LT)  EMPL  N/A  7  100%  Standard  Information  Start up  
ESRB 2010 Frankfurt (GER)       Start up 
EBA 2011 London (UK)       Start up 
ESMA 2011 Paris (FR)       Start up 





Explanation to overview Community Agencies:  
 
Staff and budget figures apply to year 2008 
Types of governance  
Standard = all Member States plus Commission 
Member States = Member States only have voting rights 
Tripartite = Member States plus social partners (employee and employers) 
Expert = Board Members nominated on a professional basis 
 
Tasks 
Information = Collecting and disseminating harmonised information 
Operational coordination = Facilitating operational coordination 
Individual application = Dealing with individual applications (ensure security on the 
market) 
Service or support = Delivering a highly specific service or support 
Soft coordination = Contributing to soft coordination  
Expert advice = Providing expert advice 
Communicating = Communicating  
 
 
Overview – Union, Euratom and Executive Agencies 
Agency  
Date of  
creation 
Location Budget 2008 Type 
Union (Security and defence)     
IIS 2001 Paris (FR) 3,8 million Security. 
EDA 2004 Brussels  27 + 8 optional Security 
EUSC 2002 Madrid (SP) 14,5 million Security 
     
Euratom   275 million total  
ESA 1958 Luxemburg  Euratom 
ITER FfE 2007 Barcelona  Euratom 
SESAR 2007 Luxemburg  Euratom 
EIT 2008 Budapest  Euratom 
     
Executive Agencies     
EAHC / EACI 2005 Brussels (EU)  15.3 million  Exec 
EACEA 2005 Brussels (EU) 41.9 million  Exec 
TEN-TEA 2006 Brussels (EU) 10.2 million Exec 
EACI 2007 Brussels (EU) 15.3 million Exec 
ERC 2007 Brussels (EU) 20 million Exec 
REA 2007 Brussels (EU) 14.6 million Exec 
91 
Overview 3 – Proposed Agencies 
Agency  
Date of  
creation 
Location 
BEREC 2010 Riga (LAT) 
ACER 2011 Ljubljana (SLOV) 
Police databases 2012  
ESA 2014 Paris (FRA) 
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